Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Jo-Ann W. Kilpatrick, George L. Gonzales, Joseph
C. Lee, David B. Lee, Marilyn D. Lee, Sidney W.
Foulger, Brent K. Pratt, Mountain West Television
Company, a Utah general partnership, and MWT
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Corporation,
a Utah corporation v. Wiley, Rein and
Part of the Law Commons
Fielding, a professional law partnership, and
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Richard
E. Wiley : Reply Brief
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Supreme Court
Harold G. Christensen, Reed L. Martineau, Rex E. Madsen, Keith A. Call; Snow, Christensen &
Martineau; attorneys for appellees.
Mark R. Kravitz, Timothy A. Diemand; Wiggin & Dana; Daniel L. Berman, Peggy A. Tomsic, David
P. Williams; Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic, Savage & Campbell; attorneys for appellants.
Harold G. Christensen (0638) Reed L. Martineau (2106) Rex E. Madsen (2052) Keith A. Call
(6708) Snow, Christensen & Martineau Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor P.O. Box 45000 Salt Lake
City, Utah 84145 Attorneys for Appellees/Plaintiffs
Mark R. Kravitz Timothy A. Diemand Wiggin & Dana One Century Tower P.O. Box 1832 New
Haven, CT 06508-1832 Daniel L. Berman (0304) Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) David P. Williams
(7346) Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic, Savage & Campbell 50 South Main, Suite 1250 Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants/ Defendants
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, No. 900901064.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3356

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JO-ANN W. KILPATRICK, GEORGE L.
GONZALES, JOSEPH C. LEE, DAVID B.
LEE, MARILYN D. LEE, SIDNEY W.
FOULGER, CLAYTON F. FOULGER,
BRYANT F. FOULGER, BRENT K.
PRATT, MOUNTAIN WEST TELEVISION
COMPANY, a Utah general partnership, and
MWT CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Appellees/Plaintiffs,
vs.
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING, a
professional law partnership, and
RICHARD E. WILEY,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING AND
RICHARD E. WILEY AND
OPPOSITION BRIEF OF CROSSAPPELLEES WILEY, REIN &
FIELDING AND RICHARD E. WILEY
Appeal Nos.

990784 SC
990785 SC

Trial Court No. 900901064 CV
URAP 29(b) Priority-15

Appellants/Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE JANUARY 19,1999 JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICTS AND THE AUGUST 26,1999 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE
GLENN K. IWASAKI OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Harold G. Christensen (0638)
Reed L. Martineau (2106)
Rex E. Madsen (2052)
Keith A. Call (6708)
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellees/Plaintiffs

Mark R. Kravitz
Timothy A. Diemand
Wiggin & Dana
One Century Tower
P.O. Box 1832
New Haven, CT 06508-1832
Daniel L. Berman (0304)
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879)
David P. Williams (7346)
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic,
Savage & Campbell
50 South Main, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah-^U44 •
Attorneys for Appellants/
Defendants
N(jy

•«••

2

2 2QQQ

p *

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

INTRODUCTION

1

ARGUMENTS COMMON TO WILEY REIN AND RICHARD WILEY

5

I.

Plaintiffs' Reading OfMargulies Bears No Relationship To
Its Text And Would Rewrite Utah Law

5

A.

7

Plaintiffs' Argument Is Contrary To Margulies

B.
II.

The District Court Erred In Taking From The Jury The
Question Of The Existence Of An Attorney-Client Relationship
The District Court Erred In Preventing The Jury From Considering

11

The Fault Of All Plaintiffs

14

A.

Defendants Did Not Need To File Counterclaims

16

B.

Defendants Never "Waived" Their Right To Have The Jury
Allocate Fault To All Plaintiffs
Defendants Submitted Proper Comparative Fault Jury Instructions

23
26

C.
III.

IV.

V.

The District Court Did Not Instruct The Jury On Defendants' Affirmative
Defenses Of Waiver And Estoppel And Its Failure To Do So Was Error

28

Plaintiffs Confirm That The Jury's Liability Determination Is Fatally
Flawed Because The District Court Allowed The Jury To Do Exactly
What This Court Said It Cannot Do - Speculate About The Disclosure
Of Confidential Information

35

The District Court Made Several Erroneous Rulings On Damages That
Resulted In An Unsustainable Damage Award

38

A.

B.

The District Court Should Have Directed The Jury To Measure
Damages From The Date Of Breach, Not Years After The Alleged
Injury Occurred

38

The Damage Award Is Impermissibly Based On Speculative Estimates... 43

C.

The Cash Call Award Cannot Stand

ARGUMENTS OF RICHARD WILEY
VI.
VII.

48
49

There Is No Basis For Personal Liability On The Part Of
Richard Wiley

49

The Court Cannot Affirm The Cash Call Award Because MWT Corp.
Never Suffered Any Harm As A Result Of The Cash Call

50

VIII. There Is No Justification For A Punitive Damage Award
Against Mr. Wiley

54

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' "CROSS-APPEAL"

56

I.
II.

56

III.

IV.

The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over The "Cross-Appeal"
The District Court Did Not Err By Refusing To Rule As A Matter
Of Law That Richard Wiley Had An Attorney-Client Relationship
With Plaintiffs

58

The District Court Should Not Have Admitted The Indemnity
Agreements Between Allstate And Defendants To Prove Defendants'
Liability

59

The District Court Correctly Excluded The Appraisal And
Testimony Of Albin Seethaler

63

CONCLUSION

66

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982)

41

Alta Health Strategies. Inc. v. CCI Mech. Serv.. 930 P.2d 280
(Utah Ct. App. 1996)

3,13

AMERCO v. Shoen. 907 P.2d 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)

33

American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech.. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996)

66

Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 709 P.2d 330
(Utah 1985)
Barilla v. Gunn Buick-Cadillac-GMC. Inc.. 528 N.Y.S.2d 273

17,48, 51, 53

(Oswego County Ct. 1988)
Black v.McKnight. 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977)

52
33

Braunv.Lorillard.Inc. No. 94-C976,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205
(N.D. 111. Jan. 11, 1996), afFd, 84 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1996)

59,60

Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

12

Brown v. McIBS. Inc.. 722 S.W.2d337 (Mo. App. 1986)

65

Burke v. Farrell. 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1982)

23

CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989)

32

CT. v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35,977 P.2d479

54

Canvon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989)

44, 45, 65

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Queen Carpet Corp..
5 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Utah 1998)
CiearCafe. L.C. v. America Online. Inc.. 50 Va. Cir. 146 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1999)
Clarke v. American Concept Ins. Co.. 758 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

19
47
32, 33

Cook Assocs.. Inc. v. Warnick. 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983)

54

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)

56

David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tullev. 203 Cal. App. 3d 884 (1988)

12

Delicious Foods Co. v. Milliard Warehouse. 507 N.W.2d 631 (Neb. 1993)

60

DeMarv v. Rieker. 695 A.2d294 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)

61

DiPrimav.DiPrima. 490 N.Y.S.2d 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)

54

E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown. 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969)

8

Eldredee v. Utah State Ret. Bd.. 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

34

InreEstateofRothko. 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977)

41

Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.
953 P.2d435 (Utah 1997)

22

Fairway Builders. Inc. v. Malouf Towers Rental Co.. 603 P.2d 513
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)

41

Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker. 936 P.2d 1088 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

22

Field v.Bover Co.. 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998)

20

Figueroa v. Citv of Chicago. No. 97-C8861,2000 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 5661
(N.D. 111. Apr. 24, 2000)

61

Geisdorf v. Doughty. 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998)

31

General Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co.. 979 P.2d 1207 (Idaho 1999)

38

Gildea v. Guardian Title Co.. 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998)

4, 35, 36

Goode v. Davton Disposal. Inc.. 738 P.2d 638 (Utah 1987)

28

Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

57

Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), affd. 912 P.2d 433
(Utah 1996)

53

Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co.. 663 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981)

27,32, 33

Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. APP. 1988)

40

Jordan v. Duff & Phelps. Inc.. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987)

57

Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 905 P.2d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

13

Lazv Seven Coal Sales. Inc. v. Stone & Hinds. P.C. 813 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1991)

35

Lvsenko v. Sawava. 2000 UT 58, 7 P.3d 783

38

MacKav v. Hardv. 973 P.2d941 (Utah 1998)

56

Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs. 147 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1998)

51

Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985)

passim

Mikkelsenv.Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384 (UtahCt. App. 1988)

42

Mindgames. Inc. v. Western Publ'g Co.. 218 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2000), reh'g
denied. No. 98-1879,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21295 (7th Cir. Aug. 22,2000).... 47,48
Moonev v. Aramco Servs. Co.. 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995)

33

Mostly Media v. U.S. West Communications. 186 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 1999)

46

National Serv. Indus.. Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co.. 937 P.2d 551
(Utah Ct. App. 1997)
Nav v. General Motors Corp.. 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1993)

18,19
passim

Nelson ex rel. Hirschfeld v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop. 935 P.2d 512
(Utah 1997)
Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr.. 1999 UT 69, 983 P.2d 575

53
56, 57

Pacific Chromalox Div. v. Irev. 787 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

33

Park v. Georgia Gulf Corp.. No. 91-569,1992 WL 714968 (D. Del. Sept. 14,1992)

36

Packer v. National Serv. Indus.. Inc.. 909 P.2d 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

18,19

Pavoni v. Nielsen. 2000 UT App. 74, 999 P.2d 595

23,25, 33

Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnell. Inc.. 784 P.2d 475
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)

39,40,46

Protectors Ins. Serv.. Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.. 132 F.3d 612 (10th Cir. 1998)
Quad County Distrib. v. Burroughs Corp.. 385 N.E.2d 1108 (111. App. Ct. 1979)
Rea v. Ford Motor Co.. 560 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1977)
Rodgers v. Withers. 593 N.E.2d 669 (111. App. Ct. 1992)

43
36, 37
42
28, 35

Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.. 144F.3d841 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

33

St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Salovich. 705 P.2d 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)

33

Schonfeld v. Hilliard. 62 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (S.D.N. Y. 1999), aff din part.
rev'din part. 218 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2000)

47

Semenza v. Nevada Med. Liab. Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 184 (Nev. 1988)

53

Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgrnt. Corp.. 916 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1990)

39,40

Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch. 1999 UT 20. 979 P.2d 317
Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978)
State v. Candelario. 909 P.2d 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, 999 P.2d 7

65
12, 58
18
64, 65

State v. South. 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996)

57

State ex rel. M.C. & K.S. v. K.H.C.. 940 P.2d 1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

18

State ex rel State Highway Dept. v. Strosnider. 747 P.2d 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)

33

Stephens v. Henderson. 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987)

22

Sucese v. Kirsh. 606 N.Y.S.2d 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)

49

Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993)

15

Super Valu Stores. Inc. v. Peterson. 506 So. 2d 317 (Ala. 1987)
Tineev v. Christensen. 1999 UT 68,987 P.2d 588

47
34, 35

Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980)

32

Walter v. Holiday Inns. Inc.. 784 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1992)

37

Wilbourn v. Stennett. Wilkinson & Ward. 687 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1996)

35

Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d887 (Utah 1988)

50

Wilson v. Maritime Overseas Corp.. 150F.3d 1 (IstCir. 1998)

27

Wilson v. Southern Pac. Co.. 44 P. 1040 (Utah 1896)

52

Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharm. Corp.. 220 N.W.2d 83 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) ... 52
Zieber v. Bogert. 747 A.2d 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), appeal denied.
2000 Pa. LEXIS 2173 (Pa. Aug. 31,2000)

26

Rules
Utah R.. App. P. 24

13, 58

Utah R. Evid. 403

59, 62

Constitutional Provisions. Statutes. And Legislative History
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (Supp. 2000)

passim

1999 Utah Laws, ch. 95, § 6

21

Floor Debate, Utah Judiciary Comm., Jan. 29,1999

21

Other Authorities
R. Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits (5th ed. 1998)
R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice (4th ed. 1996)
K. Saulsbury, Bevond the Attorney-Client Relationship: The Implied Professional
Relationship. 18 J. Legal Prof. 351-52 (1993)

44
passim

7

INTRODUCTION
In their Opposition, plaintiffs use two techniques to avoid addressing the merits of
the many errors that tainted the trial and dictated the jury's verdict in this case. First and
foremost, plaintiffs try to hide those errors behind a veil of self-serving and unjustifiable
factual assertions that are irrelevant to the errors of law committed below. Second, when
plaintiffs are forced to justify the District Court's legal rulings, they seek radically to
rewrite settled law. Neither approach should deflect this Court from the fundamental
legal errors that require reversal of the judgment against defendants.
It should now be clear that this appeal principally presents questions of law, not
fact. Plaintiffs concede that the following issues present pure questions of law that this
Court reviews de novo: (1) whether the District Court erred in granting plaintiffs a partial
directed verdict, and a peremptory jury instruction, that, as a matter of law, Wiley Rein &
Fielding ('Wiley Rein") had an implied attorney-client relationship with plaintiffs;
(2) whether the District Court violated Utah's comparative fault statute by preventing the
jury from apportioning fault among all defendants and all plaintiffs; and (3) whether the
District Court improperly refused to give the jury any instruction on defendants' special
defenses of waiver and estoppel, thereby effectively granting plaintiffs a directed verdict
on these critical defenses. See Pis.' Br. at 1.
Furthermore, while plaintiffs try to recast other legal issues as mixed questions of
fact and law, plaintiffs cannot support such wishful thinking. It is clear, therefore, that
the following errors by the District Court present additional questions of law for this
Court: (4) allowing the jury to measure damages as of the date of trial, long after the date

of defendants' last conceivable breach of duty; (5) permitting the jury to award lost
ownership and cash distribution damages based on hypothetical and speculative estimates
of plaintiffs' damage expert; and (6) letting the jury award compensatory damages (and
in Richard Wiley's case, punitive damages) for a 1991 "cash call," even though plaintiffs
admit they never suffered any harm or out-of-pocket loss as a result of the cash call.
Rather than devote space to briefing these important legal issues, plaintiffs
squander most of their allotted 140 pages on a self-serving and slanted version of the
"facts" and an impermissible cross-appeal. Plaintiffs even submit an additional 20-page
appendix purporting to correct alleged misstatements of the record.1 The reason plaintiffs
seek refuge in these alleged "facts" is all too obvious - plaintiffs cannot justify the
District Court's rulings on the basis of the law.
Plaintiffs' singular focus on their version of events is particularly indefensible in
light of the procedural posture in which many of the District Court's rulings arise. For,
while plaintiffs conspicuously avoid mentioning it, the District Court granted them partial
directed verdicts on several key issues. The court expressly granted plaintiffs a directed

Defendants will not burden this Court with a point-by-point response to the rhetoric and
accusations that permeate plaintiffs' Appendix. Suffice it to say that defendants did not
misstate the evidence and they are confident that a neutral review of the record citations
provided in defendants' briefs will expose plaintiffs' assertions for what they a r e unfounded. Defendants showed their adherence to the record by providing in their brief
direct quotations to key testimony and exhibits (principally plaintiffs' own witnesses and
exhibits) and by submitting an addendum containing important portions of the record
cited in the brief. The same cannot be said for plaintiffs, who often give no citations or
quotations to support their version of the facts. In this reply, defendants point out a
number of plaintiffs' misstatements and distortions, putting the actual evidence and
rulings of the District Court in the context of the legal issues presented.
2

verdict (and a peremptory jury instruction) when it ruled, as a matter of law, that Wiley
Rein and plaintiffs had an implied attorney-client relationship from 1988 through 1991.
The District Court also effectively directed partial verdicts for plaintiffs by refusing to
allow the jury to apportion fault among all plaintiffs and by failing to give the jury any
instructions on defendants' affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel.
It is well-established that when reviewing a directed verdict, an appellate court is
required to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Nav v. General Motors Corp.. 850 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Utah 1993); Alta Health Strategies.
Inc. v. CCI Mech. Serv.. 930 P.2d 280, 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Plaintiffs therefore are
wrong to assert that the Court must view all of the facts "in the light most favorable" to
them. See Pis.' Br. at 7. Quite the opposite is true for many issues presented by this
appeal: the existence of an implied attorney-client relationship; comparative fault; and
waiver and estoppel. As a consequence, to the extent facts are relevant to these issues of
law at all, this Court must credit the evidence supporting defendants' position and
disregard plaintiffs' self-serving version of the facts.
When plaintiffs do address the law, they repeatedly advance positions that require
this Court to alter Utah law fundamentally. Remarkably, plaintiffs do so without ever
acknowledging the profound changes they propose and without any regard for the
implications of the positions they urge. Most significantly, plaintiffs effectively ask this
Court to overturn Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), and to adopt an
"exception" to Utah's long-standing entity rule that is unprecedented in American law
and that would, by its own terms, obliterate the entity rule.
3

Plaintiffs also make no attempt to distinguish the many cases cited in defendants'
brief or even to argue that they were wrongly decided. Instead, plaintiffs simply ignore
case after case in the apparent hope that if they ignore relevant authority, perhaps this
Court will do the same. For example, in their opening brief, defendants discussed this
Court's recent decision in Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998).
Gildea held that a breach offiduciaryduty claim requires evidence of actual disclosure or
misuse of confidential information.

Speculation that confidential information "must

have" been disclosed or misused - the precise argument plaintiffs advance in this case is legally insufficient to support such a claim. Id. at 1270. Yet, plaintiffs do not discuss
or even cite Gildea.

Plaintiffs also never address or acknowledge the abundant

authorities (including Utah decisions and even the writings of their own trial expert) that
state unequivocally that damages must be measured as of the date of a breach, not, as
plaintiffs argue, years later when a casefinallyproceeds to trial.
Plaintiffs' assertions of wrongdoing, no matter how vigorously stated, do not give
them the right to ignore controlling authority or to rewrite settled law to sustain an
unsupportable verdict. By elevating their desire for a verdict over the rule of law,
plaintiffs led the District Court into numerous errors that resulted in a flawed and unjust
verdict. Plaintiffs must now reap what they have sown. This Court should set aside the
jury's verdict and reverse the judgment of the District Court in its entirety.

4

ARGUMENTS COMMON TO WILEY REIN AND RICHARD WILEY
I.

Plaintiffs' Reading Of Margulies Bears No Relationship To Its Text And
Would Rewrite Utah Law.
Plaintiffs make two important concessions regarding the District Court's error in

granting plaintiffs a directed verdict and peremptory jury instruction that, as a matter of
law, Wiley Rein had an implied attorney-client relationship with plaintiffs from May
1988 through the December 1991 cash call. First, plaintiffs have abandoned the central
argument from their post-trial briefs that the District Court's error was harmless. See
R.20753-20879 (Feb. 16, 1999 Plaintiffs' JNOV Opp. at 3-7).

Plaintiffs now

acknowledge what should be obvious: If the District Court erred in granting plaintiffs a
partial directed verdict and peremptory instruction on this point, that error necessarily
prejudiced defendants and requires - at a minimum - a new trial.
Second, and for good reason, plaintiffs make no effort to argue that they fit within
the "reasonable belief exception to the well-established rule - the entity rule - under
which an attorney representing a limited partnership ordinarily represents the entity only
and not the limited partners. As discussed in defendants' opening brief, this Court held in
Margulies that a factfinder may imply an attorney-client relationship between a
partnership's attorney and its limited partners if, based on all of the facts and
circumstances, the individual partners reasonably believed that the partnership's attorney
also represented their individual (as opposed to partnership) interests. See 696 P.2d at
1200-01. Here, however, the District Court expressly ruled that plaintiffs' professed
belief that Wiley Rein represented them from 1988 through 1991 was unreasonable in

5

light of the undisputed facts. See R.16852-16869 (Aug. 21, 1998 Mem. Decision at 15).
Plaintiffs never challenge this ruling.

Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot - and do not -

argue that the "reasonable belief exception recognized in Margulies applies and supports
the District Court's ruling that, as a matter of law, an attorney-client relationship existed
between plaintiffs and Wiley Rein from 1988 through 1991.
In light of plaintiffs' concessions, this Court is faced with only two questions:
(1) whether plaintiffs are correct in arguing that Margulies created a "separate,
alternative" exception to the entity rule under which a court would be required to find
that an attorney-client relationship exists between individual limited partners and the law
firm that represents a limited partnership whenever the partnership is asserting its rights
against the limited partners; and (2) whether this second exception applies as a matter of
law and allowed the District Court to take away from the jury the fact question of
whether an attorney-client relationship existed between plaintiffs and Wiley Rein. The
jury's verdict can be sustained only if this Court answers both of these questions in the
affirmative. However, for the reasons stated below and in defendants' opening brief, this
Court should answer each of these questions in the negative. Accordingly, the judgment
of the District Court should be reversed.

As discussed in defendants' opening brief, the District Court concluded correctly that it
was not reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that Wiley Rein represented them after Barry
Wood left the firm in September 1987. See R.16852-16869; see also Defs.' Br. at 26, 4850 (discussing additional undisputed facts, such as plaintiff Joseph Lee's writing Wiley
Rein to terminate plaintiffs' relationship with the firm, and plaintiffs' filing of a lawsuit
against Wiley Rein, showing that plaintiffs could not believe that Wiley Rein represented
them in the 1988-1991 time period).
6

A.

Plaintiffs' Argument Is Contrary To Margulies.

As an initial matter, this Court should reject plaintiffs' effort to rewrite the
Margulies decision. Aware that they are bound by the District Court's ruling that they
could not reasonably have believed Wiley Rein represented them after September 1987,
plaintiffs argue that Margulies announced a second, unprecedented exception to the rule
that an attorney representing a limited partnership does not also represent the individual
interests of the limited partners. See Pis.' Br. at 47-53. Under this purported "second test
for implying an attorney-client relationship" - which plaintiffs call the "direct
involvement" exception to the entity rule - a law firm representing a limited partnership
will always be deemed, as a matter of law, to have an attorney-client relationship with
each of the individual limited partners whenever the law firm is handling matters that
may affect the "financial viability and success of the partnership." See id. at 49-51.
Plaintiffs' contrivance finds no support in Margulies-or in any other reported decision and would, if accepted, swallow the entity rule whole.
A simple reading of Margulies rebuts plaintiffs' claim that this Court created two
"separate, alternative" exceptions to the entity rule. Rather, Margulies recognized that in
the context of a disqualification motion, even if there is no express attorney-client
relationship, "circumstances may give rise to an implied professional relationship or a
3

Notably, plaintiffs cite no decision or other authority from Utah - nor from any other
jurisdiction - supporting either their reading of Margulies or the existence of a "direct
involvement" exception to the entity rule. In fact, commentators have long noted that this
Court in Margulies merely applied the well-recognized "reasonable belief exception to
the entity rule. See, e.g.. K. Saulsbury, Beyond the Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Implied Professional Relationship. 18 J. Legal Prof. 351-52 (1993).
7

fiduciary duty toward the client." 696 P.2d at 1200 (emphasis added). In determining
what those "circumstances" might be in the context of that case, this Court looked to
federal precedent in which a district court had found that a corporate officer "reasonably
believed" an attorney was representing him personally despite the attorney's disavowal of
any attorney-client relationship. Id (citing E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown. 305 F. Supp.
371, 387-92 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (granting motion to disqualify attorney because it was
reasonable for officer to believe he was personally represented by corporation's attorney
who entered appearance on his behalf)).
The focus of the Court in Margulies was, therefore, fixed firmly on the
reasonableness of the individual partners' professed belief that in the bank lawsuit the
Jones Waldo law firm was representing both the partnership and the individual partners.
Since that lawsuit was directly "aimed at preventing foreclosure on the individual letters
of credit," id. at 1198, this Court agreed with the trial court that "it was not at all
unreasonable for the limited partners to believe that Jones, Waldo was acting for their
individual interests as well as the interests of the partnership in that litigation." Id. at
1200 (emphasis added).
This Court's reference to "direct involvement" in Margulies was not intended to,
and did not, create an additional exception to the entity rule. Rather, the reference to
direct involvement appears in a portion of the opinion in which the Court explained the
limited nature of the reasonable belief exception:
It should be noted that we do not find that an attorney automatically
becomes counsel for limited partners when he or she undertakes
representation of a limited partnership
If the limited partners stand to
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gain nothing more from the attorney's representation of the limited
partnership than the incidental gain which will accrue to them as partners,
and not in their individual capacities, no attorney-client relationship should
be implied. When, however, the individual interests of the limited partners
are directly involved, as they are here, there may be sufficient grounds for
implying the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
Id. at 1200-01 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court's use of the phrase
"directly involved, as they are here" in the above-quoted passage merely underscores that
in the bank lawsuit Jones Waldo was affirmatively representing and furthering the
personal interests of the individual limited partners "in their individual capacities," and
not merely as members of a limited partnership. There is no principled basis for twisting
this statement from Margulies -which merely explains the limits on when it is reasonable
for a limited partner to believe that the firm representing the partnership is also
representing the partners' individual interests - into creation of an unprecedented "direct
involvement" exception to the entity rule.
In fact, to adopt plaintiffs' "direct involvement" exception to the entity rule would
not merely twist this Court's language in Margulies beyond recognition - it would also
overrule that decision. In the present case, for example, plaintiffs claim that the "direct
involvement" exception applies because decisions made by MWT Ltd. - the limited
partnership that Wiley Rein represented - affected the "financial viability and success" of
the partnership (and therefore "the value of their partnership interest") and also might
have subjected them, as limited partners, "to a claim of personal liability if those
decisions led to the demise and dissolution of the partnership." Pis.' Br. at 51-52. If
plaintiffs were correct that this sort of "direct involvement" were sufficient to trump
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application of the entity rule, then any law firm representing a limited partnership would
automatically be deemed also to represent each limited partner, because a partnership's
decisions always have some effect on the partnership's success or viability or some
impact on the value of the limited partners' interests. But Margulies rightly holds that
this kind of "incidental" effect that "accruefs] to [limited partners] as partners" is not
sufficient to permit a trier of fact to imply an attorney-client relationship between a law
firm representing a limited partnership and its limited partners. 696 P.2d at 1200-01.
Furthermore, Margulies expressly affirmed the trial court's finding of an attorneyclient relationship because in the bank lawsuit the Jones Waldo law firm was "acting for"
the individual interests of the limited partners. Id. at 1200. That is why the Court looked
to what "the limited partners st[ood] to gain" from Jones Waldo's representation. Id.
(emphasis added). Here, however, plaintiffs have always asserted that in representing
MWT Ltd., Wiley Rein was harming their interests and acting adverse to the limited
partners.

Nothing in Margulies suggests that when a law firm is representing a

partnership in matters adverse to its limited partners, a court may imply an attorney-client
relationship between the law firm and the individual partners.
There should be little question that plaintiffs' "direct involvement" exception, if
accepted, would wholly obliterate the entity rule and would effectively prevent a limited
partnership from ever seeking an attorney's assistance in resolving disputes with its
limited partners. In each such case, an individual partner's interests would always be
"directly involved," as plaintiffs have defined their exception, since the success or
viability of the partnership or the value of partnership interests might be affected by the
10

partnership's decisions. In those circumstances, therefore, the law firm would always be
deemed to represent both the limited partnership and the individual partners, thereby
creating a built-in conflict of interest. Plaintiffs' "direct involvement" exception would
thus prevent a law firm from ever representing a limited partnership (or, by logical
extension, a corporation) in matters adverse to the interests of the limited partners (or
shareholders). No decision or commentary supports such a nonsensical exception to the
entity rule. In fact, courts throughout the country, including this Court in Margulies. have
recognized that an attorney must be free to represent a partnership's interests separate
from the interests of individual partners. See id, at 1200 ("A limited partnership is an
entity equivalent to a corporation... and therefore representation of a limited partnership
does not of itself require allegiance to the interests of the limited partners."); Defs.' Br. at
51-52 (citing cases). That is undoubtedly why plaintiffs never address the adverse policy
implications of adopting their truly bizarre exception to the entity rule.
B.

The District Court Erred In Taking From The Jury The Question Of
The Existence Of An Attorney-Client Relationship.

Even if this Court were to accept plaintiffs' novel exception to the entity rule, the
jury's verdict may not be sustained because the District Court erred in taking from the
jury the question of whether an attorney-client relationship existed between plaintiffs and
Wiley Rein.

In Margulies. this Court made clear that whether an attorney-client

relationship "may" be implied from the circumstances is a question of fact. Id. at 1200.
Yet, at plaintiffs' urging, the District Court took this fact question away from the jury and
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ruled that Wiley Rein had an implied attorney-client relationship with the limited partners
as a matter of law. At a minimum, this error requires a new trial.
Plaintiffs cite no decision holding that the existence of an attorney-client
relationship can be decided as a matter of law, as the District Court did in this case.4
Certainly, Margulies does not say that, and plaintiffs simply ignore other Utah decisions
that are directly contrary to their argument. See Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d 458, 460
(Utah 1978) (dispute over existence of attorney-client relationship is a factual one
sufficient to make summary judgment inappropriate); Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe.
799 P.2d 716, 729 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "whether an attorney-client
relationship exist[s]" is a "fundamental factual issue"). Tellingly, plaintiffs even ignore
the writings of their own expert at trial, who has stated that "[w]hether the attorney-client
relationship existed presents an issue for the trier of fact." 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal
Malpractice § 8.3, at 565 (4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter "Mallen, Legal Malpractice").
In Utah, a reviewing court must reverse a directed verdict if there was any
competent evidence supporting the nonmoving party's position and must consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Nay. 850 P.2d at 1263 ("We
reverse a directed verdict when the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.");

4

David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tullev. 203 Cal. App. 3d 884, 890 (1988), cited by
plaintiffs, has no application to this case. Welch holds only that, given the existence of
an attorney-client relationship, "the existence of the [fiduciary] duty is a question of law."
Id. at 890. In Welch, the existence of an attorney-client relationship was not in dispute.
See id. at 889.
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Alta Health Strategies, 930 P.2d at 284 ("[A] party who moves for a directed verdict has
the very difficult burden of showing no evidence exists that raises a question of material

i

fact."). Here, the evidence supporting plaintiffs' claim of an attorney-client relationship
is nonexistent. Indeed, the record conclusively shows that from 1988 through 1991:
(1) Wiley Rein did not represent any plaintiff; (2) at all times during this period, plaintiffs
were individually represented and billed by Ralph Hardy and his firm Dow Lohnes in
connection with all dealings with MWT Ltd.; and (3) by 1990, plaintiffs had even sued
Wiley Rein and Richard Wiley in this lawsuit, thereby completely destroying any
conceivable attorney-client relationship. See Defs.' Br. at 25-30, 41-42, 48-50 (citing
record).5 In the face of such evidence, it is impossible to conclude - a s the District Court
did -that, as a matter of law, Wiley Rein represented plaintiffs' individual interests from
1988 through the cash call in 1991. The District Court's directed verdict and peremptory
instruction are unsustainable. See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 905 P.2d 297, 299
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) ('Where there is any evidence that raises a question of material
fact... judgment as a matter of law is improper.") (emphasis added).6

5

Plaintiffs are wrong to maintain that defendants must marshal all evidence in support of
the District Court's partial directed verdict. See, e.g.. Pis.' Br. at 46-47. The rule that
appellants must "marshal the evidence" applies only when an appellant is challenging
factual findings. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). This marshalling requirement has no
application where, as here, a defendant is challenging a directed verdict for plaintiff.
6

As an afterthought, plaintiffs also suggest that this Court should disregard the District
Court's directed verdict because Wiley Rein had an alleged continuing duty of loyalty to
former clients. See Pis.' Br. at 53-55. However, this argument is entirely dependent on
two premises that are false. One premise is that defendants "admit" that Wiley Rein
represented the individual plaintiffs until Barry Wood left Wiley Rein in September
1987. See id. at 54. Defendants did no such thing, and none of plaintiffs' citations to the
13
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In sum, the District Court wrongly told the jury that, as a matter of law, Wiley
Rein was the guardian of plaintiffs' individual interests from 1988 through 1991, a time
when, as the record showed, Wiley Rein was representing only the interests of MWT Ltd.
and Northstar in matters plaintiffs considered adverse to their interests. The court's
peremptory instruction, coupled with its broadly worded instructions on the scope of a
law firm's duty to its clients, effectively directed the jury, contrary to the evidence, to
find that defendants breached their duty of loyalty to plaintiffs and to award plaintiffs
millions for actions taken by MWT Ltd. and Northstar between 1988 and 1991. Because
the District Court's error irrevocably tainted the verdict, this Court should reverse the
judgment against defendants.
II.

The District Court Erred In Preventing The Jury From Considering The
Fault Of All Plaintiffs.
Just as plaintiffs ask this Court to ignore the plain language of Margulies and to

adopt an "exception" to the entity rule that would undermine the rule's very purpose,

record supports this assertion. Rather, each cite merely corroborates what defendants do
not deny: Wiley Rein had an attorney-client relationship with the general partnership
Mountain West Television Company from 1981 to 1986, not with the individual
plaintiffs. See Defs.' Br. at 40. Indeed, had defendants admitted that Wiley Rein
represented plaintiffs during this period, the District Court could never have ruled, as it
did, that there were disputed issues of fact as to the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between Wiley Rein and the plaintiffs between 1981 and 1986, a ruling
plaintiffs do not challenge. See R. 19657-19661. The second false premise of plaintiffs'
argument is that the jury found that an attorney-client relationship existed between Wiley
Rein and plaintiffs prior to 1987. See Pis.' Br. at 54-55. The jury made no such finding.
See R.20429-20433. The District Court precluded any consideration by the jury of the
attorney-client issue with its directed verdict and peremptory instruction, which required
the jury to find an attorney-client relationship existed. Accordingly, the jury never made
any independent determination that an attorney-client relationship existed between Wiley
Rein and plaintiffs prior to 1987.
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plaintiffs also want this Court to disregard the express language, legislative history and
intent of Utah's comparative fault statute. Plaintiffs urge a reading of the comparative
fault statute that would turn the statute on its head and would violate its "main purpose"
of ensuring that defendants pay only their fair share of liability. See Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain Co.. 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993) (citing to legislative history) ('The defendant
ought to be on the hook only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the
guarantor for everyone else's damages.").
As detailed in defendants' opening brief, the provisions of Utah's comparative
fault statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 (Supp. 2000) ("the Act"),
together achieve this "fair share" objective. See Defs.' Br. at 61-62. The Act provides
courts with a straightforward rule - "the maximum amount for which a defendant may be
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-40(1); see also id § 78-27-38(3). Section 78-27-39 then sets forth
the mechanism that ensures that this statutory mandate is met: 'The trial court may, and
when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery [and] to each defendant...." Id § 7827-39(1) (emphasis added). The Act is unambiguous. Once requested by any party, the
trial court must direct the jury to determine the fault of each plaintiff and each defendant.
The District Court ignored this statutory directive.
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A.

Defendants Did Not Need To File Counterclaims.

Rather than address the Act's clear requirements, plaintiffs ask this Court to accept
the notion that, when the District Court held during trial that the jury needed to determine
plaintiffs' damages individually, the court's ruling (the "November 13 Ruling") somehow
magically "created [eleven] separate and distinct complaints on behalf of each plaintiff
against both defendants." Pis.' Br. at 58. It follows, according to plaintiffs, that the Act
required defendants to file counterclaims against these new "nonparties" in order for the
jury to consider their fault. Id. at 58-59. Plaintiffs are wrong for three reasons: (1) the
District Court never transformed this case into separate actions; (2) the Act does not
require a defendant to file counterclaims in order for a factfinder to apportion fault among
all parties to an action; and (3) the Act's 1999 amendments confirm that the Act has
never required the filing of counterclaims before the trial court is required to direct the
jury to apportion fault to each person potentially liable for a plaintiffs injuries.
First, plaintiffs point to no portion of the record that supports their assertion that
the District Court or the parties ever viewed the court's November 13 Ruling as creating
eleven separate actions. See id. at 57-58. There is good reason for this failure - the
record shows just the opposite.

For example, the District Court's jury instruction

implementing the November 13 Ruling describes just one action.

7

Furthermore, every

See R.20362 (Jury Inst. No. 20) ("Although there are 11 plaintiffs in this action, it does
not follow from that fact alone that if one plaintiff is entitled to recover, all plaintiffs are
entitled to recover. Each plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, every element of a claim alleged against a particular defendant before that
plaintiff may recover as against that defendant.") (emphasis added).
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pleading filed after the November 13 Ruling (including every motion and brief filed by
plaintiffs) demonstrates that there was only one case, with one district court docket
number and one caption collectively naming all of the plaintiffs.
The reality of what occurred below is simple.

The District Court correctly

recognized that this case involved "eleven different plaintiffs with varying interests" and
that a collective damage award, therefore, was patently inappropriate. R. 18983-18984.
The District Court did nothing more than apply the basic rule of law that each plaintiff
must individually establish that he or she is entitled to recovery. See, e.g.. Atkin Wright
& Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985).
Significantly, the District Court never ruled or even suggested (on November 13 or at any
other time) that defendants must file counterclaims before they would be permitted to
exercise their statutory right to have the jury apportion fault among all plaintiffs and all
defendants. Nor did the court suggest, even in its rulings on post-verdict motions, that
defendants' failure to file counterclaims precluded them from having the fault of all
plaintiffs considered. Plaintiffs' argument is pure fiction, motivated by their justifiable
concern that the District Court's action is unsustainable, and this Court should reject it.
Second^ plaintiffs mistakenly argue that section 78-27-41 of the Act required
defendants to join co-plaintiffs as defendants "or risk[] being found liable for more than
[their] proportionate share of fault." See Pis.' Br. at 61. By its plain terms, however, that
section merely allows - but does not require - defendants to bring other persons into a
case "for the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-41(1). Thus, the provision states that defendants "may" join other
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parties for the purposes of apportioning fault. Id Plaintiffs argue that the legislature
really meant that defendants "must" file a claim in order "to have the proportionate fault
of'any person/ other than the claiming party, determined

" Pis.' Br. at 60-61. Yet,

plaintiffs cite no legislative history to support their reading of the permissive "may" as a
mandatory "must." Plaintiffs also ignore the rule of statutory construction that a court
must "assume the legislature used each term advisedly [and must] give effect to each
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." State v. Candelario. 909 P.2d 277,
278 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Utah, as
elsewhere, "[according to its ordinary construction, the term "may" means permissive."
State ex rel. M.C. & K.S. v. K.H.C.. 940 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Section 78-27-41 serves two purposes, each of which is consistent with the Act's
"fair share" objective.

First, this provision permits, but does not require, named

defendants to bring nonparties into a case so that their fault can be included in the
apportionment process. In addition, as discussed below, section 78-27-41 provides a
procedural mechanism for a defendant to assert an individual claim for apportionment
against a party who may be dismissed from the action as a matter of law. Neither
situation is present here. Accordingly, defendants' failure to invoke a permissive and
plainly inapplicable provision cannot possibly be used to require defendants to answer for
more than their share of fault for plaintiffs' damages.
Unable to find any case adopting their reading of the Act, plaintiffs cite a trilogy
of cases -National Serv. Indus.. Inc. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co.. 937 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997); Packer v. National Serv. Indus.. Inc.. 909 P.2d 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);
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and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints v. Queen Carpet Corp.. 5 F. Supp. 2d
1246 (D. Utah 1998) - to support their argument that defendants were required to file
counterclaims against plaintiffs in order to have their fault considered in determining
liability. Because none of these cases involved defendants seeking to apportion fault to
co-plaintiffs, the decisions provide no support for plaintiffs' arguments.
Combined, Norton. Packer and Queen Carpet stand for three related propositions,
none of which advance plaintiffs' cause: (1) since the enactment of Utah's comparative
fault statute, no actions seeking to redistribute loss based on degree of fault may be
brought separately from the underlying action; (2) the Act ordinarily requires a court,
when requested and regardless of whether a counterclaim has been filed, to consider other
tortfeasors' fault when awarding damages; and (3) when a co-defendant may be
dismissed from the action as a matter of law, a defendant should file counterclaims
against the co-defendant to preserve the right to seek apportionment from that dismissed
co-defendant. As the court in Norton explained:
Under the Act, the trier of fact must take other tortfeasor's culpability into
consideration when making any damages awards, even if a cross-claim is
not or could not be filed Thus, tortfeasor codefendants do not
necessarily need to file a cross-claim to ensure that any other tortfeasor's
culpability is determined. However, if the trial court rules as a matter of
law that a codefendant bears no liability, then the fact-finder does not
consider that party when apportioning fault
[W]here one codefendant
moves for summary judgment against the plaintiff on the basis that it bears
no liability - any other defendant must file an apportionment cross-claim in
order to have standing to oppose the other codefendant's
motion
[because] the Act prohibits such an apportionment claim from
being brought outside the underlying tort action, the apportionment claim
must be brought - if at all - as a cross-claim in the underlying s u i t . . . .
Norton. 937 P.2d at 556 n.2.
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These cases thus required defendants to do nothing more than they did - follow
the plain language of the Act and ask the District Court to instruct the jury to apportion
fault among all plaintiffs and all defendants. After defendants made their request, the
statute required the court to direct the jury to apportion fault among defendants and all
plaintiffs. The District Court was wrong to do otherwise.
Third, plaintiffs miss the point of defendants' reference to the 1999 amendments
to the Act. It should be emphasized that defendants' comparative fault arguments are not
dependent on whether the 1999 amendments apply retroactively to this case. Therefore,
this Court need not reach the retroactivity issue to reverse the District Court's judgment.
As explained in their opening brief, defendants point to the 1999 amendments principally
to provide further evidence of the Legislature's long-standing intent that no defendant be
held liable for more that its proportionate share of fault. Defs.' Br. at 64-65. As this
Court made clear in Field v. Bover Co.. 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998), the Act requires the
trial court, when requested, to direct the jury to allocate fault to "three classes of persons
- plaintiffs, defendants, and immune persons

" IcL at 1081. Because defendants

indisputably made such a request, the District Court was wrong to prevent the jury from
allocating fault to all plaintiffs as required by the Act, regardless whether the 1999
amendments apply retroactively or not.
This Court would have to consider the application of the 1999 amendments to this
case only if the Court were to conclude, contrary to the record, that plaintiffs were
somehow transformed into "nonparties" at the end of trial. As defendants explained in
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their opening brief, the 1999 amendments clarified that the Act has always required fault
to be allocated to whomever may be responsible for a plaintiffs injuries, even nonparties.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39(1). Contrary to plaintiffs' claims, this was the law even
at the time of trial. See Floor Debate, Utah Judiciary Comm., Jan. 29, 1999 (noting that
the portion of the holding in Field that fault should not be attributed to nonparties, was
"contrary to the intent of the principle of comparative f a u l t . . . . [Field] changed some of
the practice before that decision so we are trying to correct that by clarifying that
defendant means any person, that even if they can't be located, can be proved has
something to do with [the claimed negligence].. .the changes that we 're recommending
will place us back in pretty much the position we thought we were in before this recent
Supreme Court case") (statement of Rep. Swallow) (emphasis added).
The Legislature expressly made the 1999 amendments retroactive to March 3,
1998 for any actions for which "a final unappealable judgment or order has not been
issued" as of the amendments' effective date, May 3, 1999. 1999 Utah Laws, ch. 95, § 6.
Since this case is now pending before this Court, no "final unappealable judgment" has
yet issued. Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. Instead, plaintiffs argue that retroactive
application of the amended Act to this case would "destroy plaintiffs' vested right in the
existing jury verdict." Pis.' Br. at 63. While the amendments do provide that courts
should not apply them retroactively if they would "destroy a vested right," see 1999 Utah
Laws, ch. 95, § 6, the legislative history to the amendments shows that plaintiffs never
had any "vested right" to exclude nonparties from the apportionment process, see Defs.'
Br. at 63-65. Where, as here, an amendment only confirms and clarifies how the law
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should have been understood at the time of trial, the amendment "will be given
retroactive effect." Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 953
P.2d 435, 440 (Utah 1997).8 Therefore, if this Court determines that plaintiffs were
nonparties, it should apply the 1999 amendments of the Act to this case and reverse.
In sum, the guiding theme of the Act has remained unchanged since its enactment
in 1986: The "maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2740(1); see also, e ^ , Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) ("Clearly, [the Act] mandate[s] that a trial court cannot apportion more fault to a
defendant than that amount of fault attributable to that defendant, even if he or she
refuses to bring other potentially liable defendants into the lawsuit."). By refusing to
instruct the jury to apportion fault among all plaintiffs and defendants, the District Court
improperly allowed the jury to attribute to defendants more than their fair share of fault
for plaintiffs' claimed injuries.

Plaintiffs' reliance on Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987), is therefore
misplaced. In Stephens, the issue before the Court was whether the 1986 amendments to
the Act should apply retroactively when the amendments were silent on this point. 741
P.2d at 953. The jury had returned a verdict finding one defendant 25% liable and
another defendant 75% liable. Since joint and several liability existed in Utah at the time
of the tort (1984), the trial court permitted plaintiff to collect the entire judgment from the
defendant who was found to be 25% at fault. Id. Because the 1986 amendments replaced
joint and several liability with a comparative fault scheme, the Stephens court held that
the amendments changed the "substantive law" in effect at the time of the tort and thus
concluded that the 1986 amendments would not apply retroactively. Id. Here, the
amendments to the comparative fault statute did not change the substantive law, but
merely clarified what the Legislature always intended the law to be.
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B.

Defendants Never "Waived" Their Right To Have The Jury Allocate
Fault To All Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs make the equally unsupportable claim that defendants somehow
"waived" their statutory right to a proper consideration and apportionment of fault among
all plaintiffs and defendants. Pis.5 Br. at 63-65. Plaintiffs can make this assertion only by
ignoring the standard of review and by closing their eyes to the mountain of evidence
demonstrating that: (1) plaintiffs were partners in the Channel 13 venture; (2) many
plaintiffs acted as agents for their fellow plaintiffs; and (3) plaintiffs were involved
intimately in the key decisions that led to Channel 13's decline. See Defs.' Br. at 56-60.
First, plaintiffs' "waiver" argument ignores basic partnership law. As this Court
has held, "[p]artners obviously occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each
other in the utmost good faith." Burke v. Farrell. 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982).
Therefore, by definition, plaintiffs who were partners in the Channel 13 venture owed
fiduciary duties to their fellow partners.
Second, because the District Court effectively directed a verdict in plaintiffs' favor
when it refused to allow the jury to apportion fault among defendants and all plaintiffs,
this Court must review the evidence demonstrating plaintiffs' fault for each others'
damages in the light most favorable to defendants. See, e.g., Pavoni v. Nielsen, 2000 UT
App. 74, \ 14, 999 P.2d 595, 596. That evidence, which plaintiffs conveniently ignore in
their brief, shows that plaintiff David Lee (a lawyer) played a pivotal role in the Channel
13 venture, provided legal advice during critical periods to his father Joseph Lee, and
acted as his father's agent and lawyer on virtually every Channel 13 matter. See, e.g..
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R.26144 at 40-41. Plaintiff Brent Pratt, by his own admission, represented plaintiff
Sidney Foulger's interests in Channel 13. Plaintiff Sidney Foulger also admitted that coplaintiffs Brent Pratt and Clayton Foulger acted as his agents and advised him regarding
the Channel 13 venture. See R.27111 at 14.
Defendants also established at trial that Sidney Foulger refused to make available
$2.6 million in financing he previously had agreed to provide Channel 13. R.25158 at
146-148, 153-154. As plaintiffs testified, Sidney Foulger's unexpected default left MWT
Ltd. in a precarious situation and without funds required to purchase the necessary
equipment and programming to put a new station on the air. R.21883 at 28; R.24600 at
149-51.9 The jury, therefore, had more than sufficient evidence to determine whether, for
example: the actions of Brent Pratt caused Sidney Foulger's damages; the legal advice
David Lee gave his father Joe Lee resulted in plaintiffs' harm; and/or Sidney Foulger's
default on his commitment to provide $2.6 million caused the station to fail and injured
his co-partners (plaintiffs Joseph Lee, Jo-Ann Kilpatrick and George Gonzales).
Plaintiffs assert, without any citation to the record, that the District Court made a
determination that this abundant evidence of the fault of co-plaintiffs for the harms that

9

Plaintiffs maintain repeatedly and erroneously that plaintiff Sidney Foulger did not
default on an obligation to provide $2.6 million in financing to Channel 13, but merely
declined to exercise an "option" to make such a contribution. See Pis.' Br. App. at 10,
12, 13. Tellingly, plaintiffs avoid citing the language of the actual document signed by
Sidney Foulger. That agreement makes it clear that he had a contractual obligation to
loan MWT Ltd. $2.6 million; the document makes no reference to a purported "option" to
provide funding. See R.31110 (DX 112) ("Northstar and Foulger agree.. . to make
loans to the Partnership.... The loan by Foulger shall be in the aggregate principal
amount of $2,600,000.") (emphasis added).
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each recovering plaintiff suffered was somehow insufficient to support a comparative
fault instruction. See Pis.' Br. at 64-65. But this is yet another fiction. The District
Court recognized that a comparative fault instruction was necessary in this case, and it
gave a comparative fault instruction. What the District Court did not do was allow the
jury to apportion fault among all plaintiffs and all defendants.

See R.20429-20443.

Plaintiffs' attempt to convince this Court that the District Court found that there was
insufficient evidence to support a proper comparative fault instruction is plain wrong.10
To affirm the District Court's refusal to allow the jury to apportion fault to all
plaintiffs, this Court would need to conclude that "reasonable minds would agree that no
substantial evidence" supported having the jury (as required by Utah's comparative fault
statute) apportion fault among all plaintiffs. Pavoni. 2000 UT App. 74, % 14, 999 P.2d at
598 (internal quote and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In view of the overwhelming
evidence that several, if not all, co-plaintiffs were at least partially responsible for the
damages that each recovering plaintiff suffered, this Court cannot draw such a
conclusion. See, e.g.. Nay. 850 P.2d at 1263 (directed verdict justified only if examining
all of the evidence "in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party," there is no

Plaintiffs also cannot credibly argue that it was a mystery to them until the charge
conference that defendants would ask the jury to consider the fault of all plaintiffs. See
Pis.' Br. at 65. Defendants were put on notice at the very beginning of this case that
defendants would argue that plaintiffs were themselves responsible for a portion of their
alleged damages. See R.13161-13177 (Defendants' Answer at ^65) ("Plaintiffs'
damages, if any, must be reduced b y . . . breach of duty, acts or omissions, contributory
negligence, assumption of the risk or fault of or attributable to the plaintiffs."). Plaintiffs
certainly never were "deprived" of the "opportunity to meet defendants' claim of fault
comparison." Pis.' Br. at 65.
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competent evidence that would support a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor). It
therefore was reversible error for the District Court to refuse to instruct the jury that it
must consider the fault of all plaintiffs when allocating liability. See, e.g.. Zieber v.
Bogert, 747 A.2d 905, 908-09 (Pa. Super. 2000) ("Because even minimal evidence of
comparative negligence requires a charge on the issue when requested, and Appellants
had requested such an instruction, we hold that the trial court should have given an
appropriate jury instruction on comparative negligence and that its failure to do so is
reversible error."), appeal denied. 2000 Pa. LEXIS 2173 (Pa. Aug. 31, 2000).
C.

Defendants Submitted Proper Comparative Fault Jury Instructions.

In a final effort to justify the District Court's error, plaintiffs argue that the special
verdict forms and jury instructions defendants proposed were inaccurate, and that the
District Court therefore properly excluded the jury from considering the fault of all
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are wrong for three reasons.
First, the District Court gave the jury a comparative fault instruction - it simply
failed properly to tell the jury that it was required to allocate fault among all plaintiffs,
not just an individual recovering plaintiff. See R.2043 6-20442. This is the sole error in
the court's comparative fault charge that defendants challenge on this appeal. Plaintiffs'
effort to raise claimed technical errors in proposed instructions on other aspects of
comparative fault (such as any alleged error in the definition of "fault" in defendants'
proposed instructions, see Pis.' Br. at 67) is, therefore, a transparent effort to deflect this
Court from the only error that is the focus of this appeal.
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Second, the forms and instructions defendants submitted accurately stated the law
and properly requested the jury to apportion fault among all plaintiffs and defendants.
Compare R. 19166-19170 (proposed special verdict form for plaintiff Joseph Lee)
(directing jury to assign fault to Joseph Lee, to the defendants, and to the other plaintiffs
if the jury "find[s] that one or more of the other plaintiffs acted or failed to act in a
manner so as to contribute to the damages that you awarded Joseph Lee"), with Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-39(1) (trial court "shall" direct the jury to determine "the percentage
or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and
to any other person whether joined as a party to the action or not").

Defendants'

proposed jury instruction similarly was proper and conformed to the language of the Act.
Compare R.19991-19994 (Proposed Jury Instr. No. 45) ("[I]f, in addition to any liable
defendant, one or more plaintiffs acted or failed to act in a manner that contributed to the
plaintiffs' claimed injury and damages, the fault of each of those plaintiffs and each liable
defendant must be considered and assigned a percentage of the total fault...."), with
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-38 through 78-27-40.
Third, even if there were any technical defects in these proposed instructions - and
there were not - it would still be error to refuse to give a comparative fault instruction
where the "requests sufficed to alert the district court to the need for some instructions,
even if not the specific ones urged by the defendants, on the affirmative defense[] of
comparative negligence." Wilson v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 150 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
1998); see also Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co.. 663 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981)
(same). This is a standard that defendants' proposed instructions satisfied.
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Defendants submitted correct jury instructions and special verdict forms, and the
District Court never ruled otherwise. Moreover, any imperfections in the proposed
instructions that plaintiffs now conjure up cannot possibly serve as a basis for supporting
the District Court's erroneous refusal to direct the jury to apportion fault among all
plaintiffs and all defendants, as required by the Act. Plaintiffs rightly do not dispute that
if the District Court erred - as it surely did - in failing to follow the Act's requirements,
defendants are entitled to a new trial on all issues. Compare Defs.' Br. at 60, 68, with
Pis.' Br. at 56-65. Therefore, this Court should reverse the judgment and order a new
trial on both liability and damages.
III.

The District Court Did Not Instruct The Jury On Defendants' Affirmative
Defenses Of Waiver And Estoppel And Its Failure To Do So Was Error.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that waiver and estoppel are recognized defenses to claims

of legal malpractice. See i d at 70-76. Plaintiffs also do not dispute that the factual
record below fiilly supports the defenses of waiver and estoppel, and that the District
Court refused to provide instructions on these defenses (thereby essentially directing a
verdict in plaintiffs' favor on two of defendants' central defenses). See id. This should
end the inquiry because "[a] party is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to
the jury, and where there is evidence to support a party's theory of the case, it is error for
the court to refuse to instruct thereon." Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638,
640 (Utah 1987); see also Rodgers v. Withers. 593 N.E.2d 669, 673 (111. App. Ct. 1992)
("[A]n instruction which omits reference to a defendant's affirmative defense is
reversible error.").
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Rather than accept the District Court's error, plaintiffs instead attempt to
rationalize the court's refusal to give any instruction on the affirmative defenses of
waiver and estoppel, by claiming that "the concepts of waiver and estoppel were given in
substance" and by raising, once again, hyper-technical - and incorrect - arguments that
defendants' proposed instructions were somehow improper.

See Pis.5 Br. at 70-71.

Neither argument has any merit.
First, as they did below, plaintiffs persist in confusing the concept of informed
consent with the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. See Pis.' Br. at 75-76.
Plaintiffs point the Court to certain of the District Court's instructions discussing the
requirements for plaintiffs to have given their informed consent to Wiley Rein's
representation of Northstar. Plaintiffs then claim that these instructions, in substance,
instructed the jury on the defenses of waiver and estoppel because they supposedly focus
on the "client's conduct" after he or she becomes aware of a conflict. See id. at 75.
However, plaintiffs fail to inform the Court that the District Court instructed the jury that
informed consent principally focuses on the attorney's conduct and whether the lawyer
adequately informed the client of the conflict. See, e.g.. R.20402 (Jury Inst. No. 55) ("A
client cannot waive the right to object to simultaneous adverse representation where full
disclosure of the effects of the adverse representation is not made."); R.20388 (Jury Inst.
No. 41) ("A lawyer representing one client may represent another client with conflicting
interests if both clients give their informed consent after full disclosure by the attorney of
all the facts, legal implications, possible effects and other circumstances relating to the
proposed multiple representation

").
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Therefore, the jury instructions, 'taken as a whole," see Pis.' Br. at 71, 74-75, told
the jury that a client can give informed consent to a conflict of interest only if he or she
was advised adequately of the conflict and the ramifications of consenting to it. What the
District Court did not tell the jury is that regardless of whether plaintiffs gave their
"informed consent" to the conflict at the outset, plaintiffs' legal malpractice claims could
still be barred if plaintiffs did not object to the conflict, and take other appropriate action,
once they became aware of it. This is the essence of the affirmative defenses of waiver
and estoppel. Yet, this concept is found nowhere in the court's instructions. In short,
instructions on informed consent do not suffice to charge a jury on waiver and estoppel.
Second, plaintiffs similarly miss the mark in arguing that defendants' proposed
jury instruction on waiver and estoppel was erroneous. The District Court never held or
even suggested that defendants' proposed waiver and estoppel instruction was worded
improperly. Rather, the court mistakenly believed that its informed consent instructions
were appropriate substitutes for instructions on waiver and estoppel. See R.21219-21231
(Aug. 13, 1999 Mem. Decision at 6).
In any event, defendants' proposed instructions were correct. Plaintiffs' claim that
the proposed waiver instruction was defective because it did not inform the jury that
"adequate or full disclosure" is a condition of "waiver,"

Pis.' Br. at 72-73, again

confuses informed consent with waiver of a legal malpractice claim. An instruction on
waiver would never include any reference to an attorney's disclosure because waiver,
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unlike informed consent, principally focuses on the client's conduct after the conflict
comes to light. See Defs.' Br. at 7 1 . n
Plaintiffs also argue that defendants' proposed waiver instruction failed adequately
to state the test for waiver (in particular, the intent element of waiver) as set forth in
Geisdorf v. Doughty. 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998). See Pis.' Br. at 73. But plaintiffs are
wrong. Consistent with Geisdorf, defendants' proposed instruction stated that waiver is
an affirmative relinquishment of a known right. Compare Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 72
("[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right."), with R.19453-19455
(Proposed Jury Inst. No. 26) ("Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known
right."). Plaintiffs also criticize defendants' proposed instruction for not stating that
silence cannot constitute a waiver unless there is some "duty or obligation to speak." See
Pis.' Br. at 73. However, defendants' proposed instruction explained that a failure to
object to a known conflict is merely a "factor" to be considered in determining whether a
party has waived a claim. See R.19453-19455. As this Court in Geisdorf noted, a waiver
may be "implied" based on an assessment of the "totality of the circumstances," a
holding that is consistent with defendants' proposed charge. See 972 P.2d at 72.

In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite their trial expert for the proposition that the
affirmative defense of waiver "must be based on full disclosure and knowledge of the
consequences." Pis.' Br. at 72. However, the passage from Mallen's treatise that
plaintiffs cite discusses the defense of ratification, not waiver. The complete sentence
from the treatise reads as follows: "In contrast to assuming liability to a third person,
however, ratification, when applied in favor of an attorney, must involve more than mere
consent or approval of the attorney's action; it must be based on full disclosure and
knowledge of the consequences." 2 Mallen, Legal Malpractice § 20.11, at 701.
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Defendants' proposed estoppel instruction was also correct. Compare Clarke v.
American Concept Ins. Co.. 758 P.2d 470, 473-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ('The elements
of estoppel are: conduct by one party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to
adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to
repudiate his conduct.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), with R. 1945319455 (Proposed Jury Inst. No. 26) ("Estoppel occurs when a party acts in a manner so as
to cause another party acting in reasonable reliance to alter its position to its harm.").
Plaintiffs incorrectly cite Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Utah 1980) for
the proposition that "silence or inaction" can never "operate to work an estoppel." Pis.'
Br. at 74. However, as this Court has held, the essential elements of estoppel include "a
statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted." CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989)
(emphasis added). Moreover, defendants' instructions properly focused on plaintiffs'
"conduct" and "acts," not their silence.
Finally, any technical errors in defendants' proposed waiver and estoppel
instruction would not permit the District Court to refuse to provide any instruction on the
defenses of waiver and estoppel and in effect grant plaintiffs a directed verdict on two of
defendants' affirmative defenses that the record supported. See, e.g.. Harville. 663 F.2d
at 603 ("Even if a requested instruction is not correct in every respect, it may impose
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upon the court a duty to submit a more specific instruction where such instruction is
necessary for the defendant's affirmative defense.").12
There can be no question that the factual record fully supported both of
defendants' affirmative defenses. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. See Clarke, 758 P.2d at 473-74. The record shows the following: (1) plaintiffs
were aware for years that Wiley Rein represented Northstar; (2) plaintiffs were
independently represented by Ralph Hardy and his firm in all matters where Northstar
was adverse to plaintiffs; and (3) plaintiffs never once objected to Wiley Rein's
representation of Northstar during the four year period from 1987-1991 when plaintiffs
assert defendants were breaching duties to plaintiffs by representing Northstar.

See

Defs.' Br. at 69-72.13 Plaintiffs' repeated failure to object to Wiley Rein's representation

12

Plaintiffs' reliance on Pacific Chromalox Div. v. Irev. 787 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App.
1990); Black v. McKnight 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977); Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.. 144
F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Moonev v. Aramco Servs. Co.. 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995);
AMERCO v. Shoen. 907 P.2d 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State ex rel. State Highwav
Dept. v. Strosnider. 747 P.2d 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); and St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v.
Salovich. 705 P.2d 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985), is therefore inappropriate. None of these
cases holds that a court can refuse to provide any instruction on an affirmative defense
that is legally viable and supported by the evidence merely because a party submits a
technically imperfect instruction. In fact, many of these cases support defendants'
position that a trial court must instruct on defenses supported by the evidence. See, e.g..
Pacific Chromalox, 787 P.2d at 1328 ("It is the trial court's duty to cover both parties'
theories and points of law in giving jury instructions, provided there is competent
evidence to support them."); Black. 562 P.2d at 622 (same).
Because the District Court essentially directed a verdict in plaintiffs' favor by refusing
to instruct on the defenses of waiver and estoppel, defendants are entitled to all favorable
inferences that can be drawn from the record. See, e.g.. Pavoni. 2000 UT App. 74, 999
P.2d595.
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of Northstar at a time when they were admittedly represented by Ralph Hardy, satisfies
the requirements of a waiver defense.
The evidence also supported an estoppel defense. As explained in Eldredge v.
Utah State Ret. Bd.. 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), estoppel is a defense based
on a "failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted." Plaintiffs'
claim that Wiley Rein represented them and breached fiduciary duties owed plaintiffs
from 1987 through 1991 was flatly inconsistent with the undisputed facts that they
retained, and relied on, Ralph Hardy to represent them during this time and never
objected to Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar during that period. Wiley Rein
properly relied on plaintiffs' retention of Hardy as well as plaintiffs' conspicuous failure
to object to Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar.

Properly instructed, the jury,

therefore, could have found that plaintiffs' conduct during this period estopped them
from asserting that Wiley Rein owed them, or breached, any fiduciary duties.
Plaintiffs quote Tingev v. Christensen. 1999 UT 68, 987 P.2d 588, for the
proposition that this Court will reverse a district court's refusal to give a proffered jury
instruction only when "there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would
have been a result more favorable to the complaining party." Pis.' Br. at 76. As the
foregoing evidence shows, defendants were in fact deprived of a more favorable result
because the jury was prevented from accepting their defenses of waiver and estoppel.
Furthermore, a decision not to instruct the jury on a party's theory is always error when
that decision prevents a party from "argujmg] its theory of the case" to the jury. Id.; see
Rodgers, 593 N.E.2d at 673 (reversible error to omit reference to defendant's affirmative
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defense). Because the District Court's instructions did not enable defendants to argue
their affirmative defenses to the jury, any "confidence in the jury's verdict is
undermined." Tingev, 1999 UT 68, f 16, 987 P.2d at 592. The verdict should therefore
be reversed.
IV,

Plaintiffs Confirm That The Jury's Liability Determination Is Fatally Flawed
Because The District Court Allowed The Jury To Do Exactly What This
Court Said It Cannot Do - Speculate About The Disclosure Of Confidential
Information.
In an effort to support the District Court's decision to send their breach of

confidentiality claim to the jury, plaintiffs ignore entirely a recent decision of this Court
(cited in defendants' opening brief) holding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim cannot
be founded on speculation that confidential information "must have been disclosed" by
the defendant. See Gildea. 970 P.2d at 1270. This Court is not alone. Courts throughout
the country hold that to find a breach of the duty of confidentiality there must be evidence
that defendants not only received confidential information, but that they actually misused
or disclosed such information. See, e.g.. Lazy Seven Coal Sales. Inc. v. Stone & Hinds.
P.C.. 813 S.W.2d 400, 409-10 (Tenn. 1991); Wilboum v. Stennett. Wilkinson & Ward.
687 So. 2d 1205, 1217 (Miss. 1996).

Plaintiffs' own trial experts confirmed this

requirement for a breach of confidentiality claim. See 2 Mallen, Legal Malpractice
§ 14.5, at 244; R.26954 at 5-6 (Prof. Morris) (agreeing that in order for there to be a
breach of confidentiality, a lawyer must "actually misuse or make unauthorized
disclosures" of confidential information).

As they do with Gildea, plaintiffs simply

ignore this abundant authority in an effort to salvage an unsustainable verdict.
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The reason plaintiffs are hiding from Gildea and this other authority is apparent plaintiffs are unable to cite any evidence that defendants actually disclosed or misused
any confidential information. Instead, as they did at trial, plaintiffs support their breach
of confidentiality claim with nothing more than unsubstantiated speculation that
defendants "must have" disclosed or misused confidential information in representing
Northstar. See Pis.5 Br. at 77-80. Thus, plaintiffs argue that defendants (in particular
Wood) "must have" divulged confidential information to Northstar because Northstar
was able to take advantage of plaintiffs during the November 1986 meetings and force
them to enter into an unfavorable business relationship. See Pis.' Br. at 78.
This is exactly the type of speculation that Gildea held was insufficient to support
a breach of confidentiality claim.

As this Court held: "without any evidence that

[defendant] communicated confidential information, such a conclusion [that defendant
must have disclosed confidential information] is pure speculation and conjecture which
cannot be allowed to form the basis of a jury's verdict." 970 P.2d at 1270. See also Park
v.Georgia Gulf Corp., No. 91-569,1992 WL 714968, at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 14, 1992) (fact
that employee who disclosed information given in confidence to executive was
terminated immediately after executive spoke with employee's manager not sufficient to
prove that executive disclosed confidential information to the manager; there "[was] not a
sufficient factual basis to support an inference that those two events were causally
connected"); Quad County Distrib. v. Burroughs Corp.. 385 N.E. 2d 1108,1111 (111. App.
Ct. 1979) (judgment based on alleged breach of confidentiality reversed where there was
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no specific act linking third party's access to information with a breach and only basis for
concluding that the information was divulged was "assumption and supposition").
Moreover, plaintiffs overlook the unequivocal testimony at trial that defendants
never disclosed or misused any confidential information, and fail to deal with the
testimony of their own trial experts who agreed, based upon their review of the record,
that there was no evidence of actual misuse or disclosure of confidential information by
defendants.

Defs.' Br. at 74-75. Although a jury is permitted to draw reasonable

inferences from the evidence, a jury may not base its verdict on pure speculation,
particularly when, as here, such speculation flies in the face of the record. See Walter v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 1159,1179-80 (D.N.J. 1992) ("[P]laintiffs cannot rest on
the hope that the jury will not believe the record evidence and therefore spin a web of
under-handedness which entangles the defendants

There must be some affirmative

evidence that the event occurred.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).14
Therefore, as set forth in their opening brief, defendants are entitled to judgment on
plaintiffs' breach of the duty of confidentiality claim and a new trial on all remaining
issues. See Defs.' Br. at 76.

Plaintiffs repeat their mantra that defendants failed to marshal the evidence
the jury's verdict. Pis.' Br. at 77. But plaintiffs are wrong. Defendants did
their opening brief the speculative "evidence" of misuse that plaintiffs cite.
Br. at 75. Furthermore, defendants detailed the evidence that demonstrates
never misused or disclosed any confidential information. See id. at 73-76.
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V.

The District Court Made Several Erroneous Rulings On Damages That
Resulted In An Unsustainable Damage Award.
A.

The District Court Should Have Directed The Jury To Measure
Damages From The Date Of Breach, Not Years After The Alleged
Injury Occurred.

Plaintiffs admit that the jury awarded them damages measured as of the date of
trial (based on their expert's 1997 damage calculations), not as of the date of any claimed
breach. See Pis.' Br. at 89 (jury awarded "lost profits from 1987 to the date of trial and
the [market] value of Channel 13 as of the date of trial") (emphasis added). This
admission makes clear that the jury's lost ownership damage award cannot stand because,
as cases in Utah and throughout the country hold, the jury must measure damages as of
the date of the breach - not years later when the case is tried. See Defs.' Br. at 78-80.15
Plaintiffs' argument in support of the District Court's decision to allow the jury to
measure plaintiffs' damages as of the date of trial, rather than as of the date of breach,
boils down to a single flawed proposition: plaintiffs assert that awarding them damages as
of the date of the breach would somehow "under-compensate" them. See Pis.' Br. at 85,
89. This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal rules governing

Issues relating to the proper measure of damages present questions of law when there is
a "rule or principle" governing the measure of damages that can be "uniformly applied."
Lvsenko v. Sawava. 2000 UT 58, 7 P.3d 783, 787. There is such a "rule or principle"
that can be "uniformly applied" in this case (and in all similar cases) - damages are to be
measured from the date of the breach. See Defs.' Br. at 78; see also General Auto Parts
Co. v. Genuine Parts Co.. 979 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Idaho 1999) (measure of damages is a
question of law reviewed de novo). Plaintiffs therefore are wrong to claim that the
standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. See Pis.' Br. at 83.
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the recovery of damages, which, if accepted, would radically alter the way damages are
awarded throughout this State.
To begin with, even plaintiffs' own damage expert rejects their false cry of undercompensation. Mr. Schutz offered two damage estimates: one as of 1987 and another
(discussed below) as of the expected date of trial in 1997. Mr. Schutz testified that his
estimate of the fair market value of Channel 13 (i.e., lost ownership damages) as of 1987,
shortly after the FCC awarded MWT Ltd. the Channel 13 license, would account fully for
both the going concern value of Channel 13 at the time of defendants' alleged breach plus
future profits the station might have earned for ten years thereafter, discounted to present
value. See R.26677 at 45-52; see also R.29534 (PX 293). It is difficult to understand how
such an award could possibly under-compensate plaintiffs.
Courts in Utah confirm that measuring market value damages as of the date of an
alleged breach ensures that a plaintiff is fully compensated for all damages proximately
caused by that breach. See, e.g.. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnell. Inc..
784 P.2d 475, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that because liability attaches "at the
time of the loss," an appraisal done shortly after a breach "is more relevant to the actual
loss incurred" than measuring damages years later at the time of trial) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). This long-standing rule for measuring damages is followed
throughout the country. For example, in Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgmt. Corp.. 916 F.2d
820, 826 (2d Cir. 1990), a case discussed in defendants' opening brief but which plaintiffs
do not even cite, the Second Circuit explained: "Measuring . . . damages by the value of
the item at the time of the breach is eminently sensible and actually takes expected lost

future profits into account

The [market] value of assets . . . is the discounted value of

the stream of future income that the assets are expected to produce. This stream of
income, of course, includes expected future profits and/or capital appreciation." Id. at 826
(emphasis added).
The reasons for this uniform rule are quite sensible, which is undoubtedly why
plaintiffs never bother to discuss the rule's rationale. If the time of trial, as opposed to the
date of breach, governed the date for measuring damages, 'the rule would be a two-edged
sword, because courts would have to diminish damage awards where the value of the item
decreased or where losses were encountered subsequent to the breach as well as enhance
them where conditions improve." Id.; see also Price-Orem. 784 P.2d at 480 ("[Defendant
cannot take advantage of events occurring after harm has occurred and liability has
attached to reduce the damages for that harm.") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Allowing the court's docket to control the date for measuring damages would
mean that a plaintiffs recovery would never be tied to the damages the plaintiff actually
suffered at the time of breach; instead, the amount of plaintiff s recovery would ebb and
flow based on the court's docket and market conditions from the date of breach until the
date of trial.
Far from rebutting defendants' arguments, the authorities plaintiffs cite support the
rule that damages should be measured as of the date of the breach, not the time of trial.
For example, in Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the
court held that the measure of damages for conversion "is the value of the property at the
time of conversion, plus interest." Id. at 468 (internal quote and citation omitted); see
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also Fairway Builders, Inc. v. Malouf Towers Rental Co.. 603 P.2d 513, 525-526 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1979) (acknowledging that "the general rule appears to be that the rights of the
parties with respect to a breach of contract are fixed at the time of breach and that
damages are measured as of that time").16
Other cases plaintiffs cite are simply inapposite. For example, in Alexander v.
Brown. 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982), this Court held that when a party breached a 1973
contract to pave a road and install a curb, gutter and sidewalk, plaintiffs were entitled to
"benefit of the bargain" damages in 1980 (the date of the trial) that were calculated by
looking at the 1976 costs incurred by plaintiffs' neighbor for similar road improvements
and estimating how much it would cost plaintiff to have the bargained for improvements
made. Id at 695. In Alexander, the plaintiffs could only be made whole by receiving
sufficient money at the time of trial so they could then pay for the road improvements for
which they bargained.

Here, plaintiffs would have been made whole by measuring

damages as of the date of the breach, because such damages would have awarded
plaintiffs the value of Channel 13 as of the time of the breach, including ten years of
future profits.17

16

The Fairway Builders court upheld an award of damages for repair of an improperly
installed surface to the exterior of a building that was calculated as of the trial date
because "the extent of the breach (requiring the entire removal of the marblecrete) was
not ascertainable until two years after its installation and shortly before the trial." 603
P.2d at 527. Therefore, the date of trial and the date when the extent of the breach fiilly
manifested were virtually identical. This is not so here. The date of trial was eight years
after the latest conceivable breach (i.e., the 1990 sale of Channel 13 to Fox).
17

InreEstateofRothko. 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977), is also distinguishable. There, the
court affirmed an award based on the appreciated value of paintings sold in violation of
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By impermissibly allowing the jury to award damages measured as of the date of
trial, the District Court allowed the jury to over-compensate plaintiffs in violation of the
basic rule of awarding damages only for actual losses sustained. The over-compensation
is obvious: Mr. Schutz's 1987 estimate of lost ownership damages (which included a
projection of lost profits from 1987 to 1997) was $10 million; yet, the jury awarded
plaintiffs more than $23 million. The only way to correct this error is by granting a new
trial. And because the jury's damage calculation is inextricably linked to the date when
any breach occurred, the new trial must include both liability and damages.

See

Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384,1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
For similar reasons, plaintiffs are also wrong when they assert that the jury was
entitled to award them both lost cash distributions from the date of breach until the date
of trial plus lost ownership damages as of the date of trial. There is no basis for
permitting such double recovery.

As plaintiffs' damage expert confirmed, plaintiffs

cannot recover lost ownership damages as of the date of any breach plus future cash
distributions, because the lost ownership damages already include lost future profits.

an injunction and restraining order when the executors had a duty to abide by these orders
and retain the paintings. The New York court did not address the issue of the
appropriateness of measuring damages from the date of the breach when, as here, doing
so would fully compensate plaintiffs for all damages flowing from the alleged breach.
Similarly, Rea v. Ford Motor Co.. 560 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1977), and the string of cases
that plaintiffs cite in footnote 26, see Pis.' Br. at 88, also do not support deviating from
the rule that damages should be measured from the date of the breach. These decisions
consider issues related to the award of non-speculative lost profits for a reasonable time
after the breach. That is just what Mr. Schutz's 1987 estimate did. These decisions,
therefore, support defendants' argument that damages must be calculated from the date of
the breach, not the date of the trial.
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R.22155 at 16 ("Q. You can't have both, can you? A. That is correct."). In the end, even
plaintiffs are forced to concede as much.

For they implicitly acknowledge, quite

correctly, that if damages were properly measured as of the date of the breach, it would
constitute an impermissible double recovery for the jury to award both lost ownership
damages as of the date of the breach plus future cash distributions after that date. See
Pis.' Br. at 90 ("Lost future profits [beyond 1998] would at least arguably duplicate the
award based on the 1998 value of Channel 13 because the 1998 station value would be
based on projected future profits."). Therefore, in reversing the judgment, this Court
should vacate the jury's $6.4 million award of cash distributions damages because that
award gives plaintiffs recovery for the same lost profits that are included in a fair market
value of Channel 13 as of the date of breach. See Defs.' Br. at 80-82; see also Protectors
Ins. Serv.. Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.. 132 F.3d 612, 615-17 (10th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff
may not recover both lost ownership value, when future earnings are considered in
arriving at that value, and future profits as this would constitute a double recovery).
B.

The Damage Award Is Impermissibly Based On Speculative Estimates.

Plaintiffs had only one expert, Mr. Schutz, provide evidence of their damages as of
1997, and, as plaintiffs concede, the jury awarded plaintiffs damages as of that date. See
Pis.9 Br. at 89. Mr. Schutz5 s assessment of plaintiffs' lost ownership damages as of 1997
consisted of hypothetical "revenue and cash flow projections for the station during the
1987 to 1997 period" plus a fair market value estimate as of 1997 that was founded on
"revenue and expense projections for channel 13 from 1997 onward for 10 years" until
2007. R.0295 55-029564 (PX 295 at 2-3). Therefore, by awarding damages as of the date
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of trial, as opposed to the date of breach, the jury awarded plaintiffs twenty years (19872007) of hypothetical lost profits. See Pis.' Br. at 89, 91-92. It is only by relying on Mr.
Schutz's speculative estimates of twenty years of hypothetical profits that any jury could
award more than $23 million to the part owners of an untested television station that was
on the verge of bankruptcy almost immediately after it went on the air - an award that
ignores reality and represents a 23,000% return on plaintiffs5 $100,000 investment. See
Defs.5 Br. at 6, 26-29 (citing record).
In their scramble to defend an indefensible award, plaintiffs once again ignore
well-established precedent in Utah and elsewhere holding that estimates of a new
business' future success that are not based on prior or comparable operating experience
are inherently speculative and, therefore, legally inadequate to support a lost profit award.
See, e.g., Canvon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1989) (reversing
award of damages for lost business based on 'theoretical" revenue figures); see also
Defs.5 Br. at 86-90 (citing cases); R. Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits § 7.14,
at 557 (5th ed. 1998) (speculative damage evidence goes to admissibility and "[i]f expert
testimony is improperly admitted at trial based on assumptions of fact not substantiated
by the evidence, a judgment in favor of the party propounding the expert testimony
should be reversed").

Plaintiffs also do not address the numerous cases requiring

presentation of even more particularized evidence when valuing an entertainment venture
like Channel 13, because of the uncertainties in predicting future profits in such a fickle
industry. Id. at 88. Plaintiffs' silence speaks volumes; it only underscores that plaintiffs5
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expert's speculative lost profit estimates fall far short of proving damages "with
reasonable certainty." Canyon Country. 781 P.2d at 417.18
Plaintiffs' explanation of what Mr. Schutz did to arrive at Channel 13's
hypothetical revenue and expense figures only confirms the speculative and legally
insufficient nature of his lost profit calculation and fair market value appraisals. In
determining his revenue figures, plaintiffs concede that Mr. Schutz "estimated" Channel
13's share of total advertising revenues for the Salt Lake City market to arrive at a gross
income figure. See Pis.' Br. at 98. This revenue "estimate" was not based on any actual
revenue figures of Channel 13 or any other comparable television station in Utah. It was
simply a guess. R.22097 at 28-31.
Mr. Schutz's "estimated direct costs" of operating Channel 13 (see Pis.' Br. at 98)
were equally speculative; they were based on industry-wide data with no consideration of
Channel 13's actual expenses or the actual operational costs of any other comparable
television station in Utah or elsewhere. As Mr. Schutz candidly agreed when questioned
by defendants' counsel: "Q

[E]very single item of expense in every one of your

Contrary to what plaintiffs want this Court to believe, damages cannot be based on
pure conjecture. As the cases cited by plaintiffs hold, a plaintiff must still establish
damages with reasonable certainty. See Pis.' Br. at 80-83 (citing decisions that confirm
that damages must be proven with "reasonable certainty"). Plaintiffs also incorrectly
characterize defendants' damage arguments, claiming that defendants are essentially
challenging the denial of a remittitur motion and complaining about the admissibility of
expert testimony. See id. at 92. Plaintiffs improperly transmute this issue in order to
avoid facing the fact that the District Court committed a fundamental legal error when it
permitted the jury to award damages based on the speculative estimates of Mr. Schutz.
Finally, contrary to plaintiffs' claims, defendants marshal the evidence on this issue in
their opening brief and demonstrate that, viewed in any light, the evidence was too
speculative to support the damage award. See Defs.' Br. at 82-90.
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studies simply represents your estimate of the amount of that item of expense for the
period involved based on your judgment.... A. That is correct." R.22097 at 27. In
summary, Mr. Schutz confirmed that all of his numbers are estimates for the Channel 13
revenues and expenses. R.26389 at 62-63. Indeed, Mr. Schutz9 s own written damage
appraisals contain the disclaimer that his estimates "are primarily intended for investment
evaluation purposes only" and that they "should not be considered as either a direct or
indirect prediction[] of what would actually occur." R.29534 (PX 293 at 3).19
Recognizing that their expert's speculative estimates do not satisfy the reasonable
certainty standard, plaintiffs ask this Court to uphold the jury's award on the basis of
other "damage" evidence in this case, including appraisals and business plans by Frazier,
Gross & Kadlec, Barry Wood, CPL and Northstar. See Pis.' Br. at 93-96. This Court
should reject plaintiffs' invitation.

Appraisals and business plans generated for the

purpose of attracting investors are not sufficient to establish lost profits for a start-up
venture. For example, affirming the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs proof of damages
was too speculative, the Eighth Circuit in Mostly Media v. U.S. West Communications.
186 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 1999), held that the parties' business plans could not be used to
establish lost profits since these plans "were nothing more than optimistic projections for
19

Plaintiffs are wrong to claim that the appraisal approved by the court in Price-Orem.
784 P.2d 475, and Mr. Schutz's appraisals are "very similar." Pis.' Br. at 100. Nothing
is further from the truth. The rental revenue figures used in arriving at the appraised
value in Price-Orem were based on the actual rents paid by other tenants in the shopping
center in question and the rates paid by other tenants in comparable shopping centers in
the surrounding Price-Orem area. 784 P.2d at 479. As demonstrated above, Mr. Schutz
did not use any actual revenue and expense figures from Channel 13 or any other
television station in Utah.
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an enterprise that never got off the ground." Id. at 866. Similarly, in Schonfeld v.
Hilliard. 62 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1076-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 218
F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2000), the district court rejected use of "business plans sent to
investors" to establish lost profits, noting that the solicitation to invest in a start-up cable
television channel "is as much an appeal to faith as to experience" and does not establish
with any degree of certainty that the projected revenues would eventually be realized.
See also CigarCafe. L.C. v. America Online. Inc.. 50 Va. Cir. 146, 162 (Va. Cir. Ct.
1999) (forecast of projected profits developed by plaintiff and defendant "would be too
speculative to use as evidence" of lost profits where the forecast was merely the estimates
of the profits the parties hoped the joint venture would reap).
Plaintiffs' reliance on Super Valu Stores. Inc. v. Peterson. 506 So. 2d 317, 330
(Ala. 1987) is therefore misplaced. In Super Valu. an Alabama court permitted a lost
profit award based on a party's pre-dispute projections because the projections resulted
from "the application of a scientific methodology that for many years had accurately
predicted the future performance of stores associated with Super Valu." 506 So. 2d at
330. Here, there is no evidence that these "pre-dispute" business plans and appraisals
would accurately have predicted the future success of Channel 13. In fact, the evidence
shows that the optimistic business plans cited by plaintiffs quickly proved wrong and that
Channel 13 was a failed venture that lost over $11 million in its first two years of
operations. See Defs.' Br. at 85.
The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated that "[d]amages must be proved, and not
just dreamed." Mindgames. Inc. v. Western Publ'g Co.. 218 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir.
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2000), reh'g denied. No. 98-1879, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21295 (7th Cir. Aug. 22,
2000). The court cautioned that "[A] start-up company [like Channel 13] should not be
permitted to obtain pie-in-the-sky damages upon allegations that it was snuffed out before
it could begin to operate... capitalizing fantasized earnings into a huge present value
sought as damages . . . . " Id. These comments fit this case exactly: the only thing Mr.
Schutz did was capitalize fantasized earnings for a Channel 13 that never existed.
Because the evidence supporting the damage awards was based on nothing more than
speculation heaped upon conjecture, plaintiffs failed to establish damages with the
requisite degree of certainty and this Court should vacate the jury's award of both lost
ownership and cash distributions damages.
C.

The Cash Call Award Cannot Stand,

As set forth more folly below, the "cash call" award against Wiley Rein and
Richard Wiley is not sustainable. Even though plaintiffs admittedly suffered no harm as
a result of the issuance of a memorandum that Northstar sent to plaintiffs notifying them
of the need to make up the deficiencies in their limited partner capital accounts, the socalled "cash call," see R.033408-033416 (DX 511), plaintiffs ask this Court to uphold the
award and ignore the black letter rule that requires a plaintiff to establish that he or she
suffer some actual injury before being entitled to recover damages, see* e^g., Atkin
Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d at 336 (reversing judgment when plaintiff could not establish
actual damages). It is undisputed that plaintiffs did not suffer (and never will suffer) any
actual harm as a result of the cash call. Therefore, this Court should reject plaintiffs'
efforts to retain such a windfall.
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ARGUMENTS OF RICHARD WILEY
VI.

There Is No Basis For Personal Liability On The Part Of Richard Wiley.
Plaintiffs attempt to make much of what Richard Wiley already has conceded:

that, as a partner in Wiley Rein, he is liable for his share of any damages the firm may
have caused plaintiffs. See Defs.' Br. at 92. Since a law firm is essentially one lawyer
for purposes of fiduciary duties, each law firm member is vicariously bound by the
ethical obligations of other lawyers in the firm and liable for a share of any damages the
firm causes.
Plaintiffs' citation to this legal truism, and their accompanying recitation of facts
seeking to establish that Richard Wiley was bound by Wiley Rein's duties to plaintiffs,
ignores Richard Wiley's arguments in this case. For by filing two separate claims in this
action, with two special verdict forms, plaintiffs separately sought damages from both
Wiley Rein and Richard Wiley personally.

Moreover, the jury awarded plaintiffs

damages (including punitive damages) against Mr. Wiley personally, over and above and
in addition to the damages assessed against the firm.

See R.20429-20443; R.20507-

20508. To receive compensatory and punitive damages from Richard Wiley personally,
in addition to any damages he would be liable for as a member of Wiley Rein, plaintiffs
were required to establish some personal attorney-client relationship between Richard
Wiley and plaintiffs. See Sucese v. Kirsh. 606 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
Plaintiffs' refusal to acknowledge this fundamental distinction confirms that they
seek, in essence, double recovery for the same conduct. For it is uncontroverted that Mr.
Wiley did not have a personal attorney-client relationship with any individual plaintiffs at
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anytime. See Defs.' Br. at 93-98 (citing record). Plaintiffs claim that the record shows
that Richard Wiley had a personal attorney-client relationship with MWT Corp., the only
plaintiff with whom the jury found Richard Wiley had an attorney-client relationship. In
fact, the portions of the record cited show no such thing. See, e.g.. R.27176 at 73, 76-77
(Mr. Wiley states that the firm represented MWT Ltd., not a party to this litigation, and
its general partner MWT Corp.); R.29686-29729 (PX 302B) (time records show Mr.
Wiley performing legal services for Northstar). That plaintiffs are forced to rely on such
citations confirms that there is no evidence to support the jury's finding that Richard
Wiley had a personal attorney-client relationship with MWT Corp.
To the extent plaintiffs are entitled to recover any damages from Wiley Rein,
Richard Wiley, as a partner in the firm, is responsible for his fair share. To require more
of Richard Wiley (or any other Wiley Rein partner for that matter), without requiring
plaintiffs to prove the existence of a personal attorney-client relationship, would violate
basic tort law.

See Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988) (attorney

malpractice actions require proof of an attorney-client relationship). There is no reason
to rewrite Utah law to sustain the unjust verdict in this case.
VII.

The Court Cannot Affirm The Cash Call Award Because MWT Corp. Never
Suffered Any Harm As A Result Of The Cash Call.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to hold that individuals who never suffered any actual

harm are nonetheless entitled to recover damages. See Pis.5 Br. at 103-06. Although
plaintiffs wrongly assert that this is a sufficiency of the evidence issue, plaintiffs really
want this Court to adopt a new rule of law that would permit plaintiffs to recover
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damages based on Northstar's mere issuance of the "cash call" memo. See R.033408033416 (DX 511). Yet plaintiffs acknowledge that they never paid a dime as a result of
the cash call, Northstar took no steps to recover against plaintiffs on the cash call,
plaintiffs will never be required to pay the cash call, and plaintiffs have suffered no harm
as a result of the cash call. As plaintiffs' star witness Joseph Lee testified, plaintiffs
"haven't paid them [the cash calls]," plaintiffs "protested them," and "[t]here has been no
suit [to collect them]." R.24794 at 76. The Court should reject yet another request by
plaintiffs to ignore black letter law - this time, the rule that requires a plaintiff to
establish that he or she has suffered or will suffer some quantifiable injury before
recovering damages.

See, e.g., Atkin Wright & Miles. 709 P.2d at 336 (reversing

judgment when plaintiff could not establish actual damages).
Once again, plaintiffs ignore the case law defendants cite in their opening brief.
For example, plaintiffs do not discuss or even cite the recent decision of the Second
Circuit holding that the mere receipt of a letter from a credit card company demanding
payment of a debt did not establish actual damages, because there was "no evidence in
the record that [plaintiff] paid the debt, acted in reliance on the letter, suffered emotional
loss or harm, or responded to the letter in any way." Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs..
147 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1998). More telling, plaintiffs also pay no attention to their
own liability expert who has written: "The mere possibility, or even probability, that the
plaintiff will sustain an injury at some time does not alter the speculative nature of the
damage claim or support a cause of action for legal malpractice." 2 Mallen, Legal
Malpractice § 19.3, at 599-600 (emphasis added).
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Rather than deal with this clear authority and their own expert's treatise, plaintiffs
claim that the right to recover damages arises "when the plaintiff becomes legally bound
to pay a bill or demand, even though the demand has not been paid at the time of trial."
Pis.5 Br. at 104 (emphasis added).

It goes without saying, however, that a request for

payment does not, in and of itself, make plaintiffs "legally bound9' to do anything.
Surely, had Northstar ever sought to recover the cash call amounts - and it never did plaintiffs would have vehemently denied any legal liability. In fact, Joseph Lee testified
that plaintiffs "protested" the cash call memo when it was issued. See R.24794 at 76.
Therefore, plaintiffs cannot claim that they became "legally obligated" to pay the cash
call by merely receiving a memo from Northstar.
Plaintiffs also refuse to accept the undoubted fact that they cannot now be "legally
bound" to pay the cash call. As explained in defendants' opening brief, any claim to
recover on the cash call is barred because the limitations period ran before trial even

The cases plaintiffs cite in support of this proposition merely hold that, when it is
undisputed that the plaintiff will have to pay a debt in the future, a plaintiff is entitled to
recover for damages a plaintiff actually has suffered. See Wilson v. Southern Pac. Co..
44 P. 1040, 1042 (Utah 1896) (allowing recovery for medical expenses incurred as a
result of injuries sustained when train hit plaintiff even though the medical bills had not
been paid as of the date of trial); Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharm. Corp., 220
N.W.2d 83, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (allowing recovery for financial liability incurred,
even though not actually paid at time of trial, when "the liability must eventually be
satisfied"); Barilla v. Gunn Buick-Cadillac-GMC Inc., 528 N.Y.S.2d 273, 280 (Oswego
Cty. Ct. 1988) (allowing recovery for expenses incurred as a result of breach of a used car
warranty where plaintiff was legally liable to pay the amount although she had not done
so). None of these cases deals with a situation where, as here, a plaintiff did not suffer
any damages as a result of a request for payment, is not legally bound to make any
payment merely due to the issuance of the request, and can never in the future be required
to make any payments pursuant to the request.
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commenced. See Defs.' Br. at 101. The District Court took judicial notice that the
statute of limitations for claims based on the cash call was six years, that the limitations
period began to run in 1991, and that as of 1998 (seven years later) no one had sought to
enforce the cash call. R.27121 at 132-136. Plaintiffs do not challenge these rulings.
While the District Court did suggest that there was a remote possibility that at trial
plaintiffs could produce some facts establishing that the statute of limitations on the cash
call had been tolled, see id, plaintiffs never presented any such evidence, because there is
none. More important, to this day plaintiffs have not provided a shred of evidence that
they suffered amy harm by receiving the cash call. See Pis.' Br. at 103-106. Actual harm,
not the hypothetical "risk of a multi-million dollar liability," id. at 103, is what is required
to prove liability and damages, se^ e^g., Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993), afFd, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996); Atkin Wright & Miles. 709 P.2d at 336;
Semenza v. Nevada Med. Liab. Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 184,186 (Nev. 1988).
In short, this Court should not permit any recovery for cash call damages because
plaintiffs admit that neither MWT Corp. (the only plaintiff to whom the jury awarded
cash call damages), nor any other plaintiff, suffered any actual harm as a result of the
cash call. Allowing this award to stand would give plaintiffs an impermissible windfall
of $184,000 in clear violation of Utah law that a plaintiff "may not recover... more than
his actual damages." Nelson ex rel. Hirschfeld v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop.
935 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1997). This Court should, therefore, vacate the jury's award of
cash call damages against both Mr. Wiley and Wiley Rein.
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VIII. There Is No Justification For A Punitive Damage Award Against Mr. Wiley.
Plaintiffs agree that a jury may only award punitive damages if plaintiffs are
entitled to recover compensatory damages. See Pis.' Br. at 110. Because cash call
damages were the only compensatory damages that the jury awarded against Richard
Wiley and because there is no basis for that award, this Court must also set aside the
jury's punitive damage award against Mr. Wiley. Defs.' Br. at 98-102; C.T. v. Johnson.
1999 UT 35, % 15, 977 P.2d 479, 483 (noting that this requirement "assure[s] that
punitive damages cannot be recovered where the plaintiff did not sustain any monetary
loss or injury").
Even if this Court were to sustain the cash call award, however, there is no
evidence supporting the punitive damage award against Richard Wiley. Plaintiffs argue
that punitive damages need not relate to the conduct giving rise to the compensatory
damage award. See Pis.' Br. at 111. But that is not the law in Utah. This Court in Cook
Assocs.. Inc. v. Warnick. 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983), held that punitive damages must be
tied to tortious conduct. As this Court put it, there must be "an award of compensatory
damages to which such punitive damages [can] be ascribed." Id at 1168; see also
DiPrima v. DiPrima. 490 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (finding attorney
engaged in "deceit or collusion," but rejecting punitive damages because conduct was
unrelated to plaintiffs injury). Plaintiffs also neglect to follow the teachings of their own
trial expert, who has written that punitive damages must relate to the acts causing the
harm for which compensatory damages are awarded. See 2 Mallen, Legal Malpractice
§ 19.16, at 625 ("[T]he conduct that supports a punitive damages claim must bear a
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relationship to the wrongs that are the basis of the legal malpractice claim."). As a
consequence, plaintiffs' claims that Richard Wiley acted with malice or fraudulent intent
during the period before the cash call-assertions

that are not supported by the record -

are irrelevant. Those allegations have no bearing on the 1991 cash call, the only injury
that was the basis for the jury's compensatory damage award against Mr. Wiley.
Finally, plaintiffs' list of the alleged evils Richard Wiley committed before the
cash call, Pis.' Br. at 111-14, merely demonstrates that he was representing the interests
of Northstar (as both a Northstar board member and attorney for Northstar), not that he
was "willfully, knowingly and recklessly disregarding] the rights of MWT Corp.," an
entity with which Mr. Wiley never had an attorney-client relationship and that was
separately represented by Ralph Hardy in all of its dealings with Northstar. See Defs.'
Br. at 26, 91-97 (citing record).
Moreover, at the time the cash call was issued, Wiley Rein no longer represented
any plaintiff. There was no evidence that Richard Wiley, who merely served as a director
of Northstar, had any direct involvement in the sending of the cash call, which simply
notified the limited partners in accordance with the MWT Ltd. Agreement of the need to
fund negative balances in their capital accounts. See Defs.' Br. at 29-30, 103-04 (citing
record).

Mr. Wiley cannot be punished for Northstar's exercise of its contractual

obligation as MWT's general partner to issue the cash call. Mere conclusory assertions
that Richard Wiley acted with malice in carrying out his responsibilities as a Northstar
director (notably, not as plaintiffs' lawyer), Pis.' Br. at 112, do not rise to the level of
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"outrageous conduct" or "exceptional case" for which punitive damages are warranted.
See* e ^ , Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 807 (Utah 1991).
In this case, malice is nonexistent. Plaintiffs' efforts to demonize Mr. Wiley
cannot substitute for evidence. Accordingly, the Court should set aside the punitive
damage award against Mr. Wiley.
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS9 "CROSS-APPEAL"
In a tacit recognition that the District Court's errors require reversal of the
judgment and a new trial, plaintiffs ask this Court to provide advisory opinions on issues
they assert will recur upon remand. The Court should reject plaintiffs' request. First, this
Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs' purported "cross-appeal." Second, not one of
plaintiffs' arguments has any merit.
I.

The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over The "Cross-Appeal."
Plaintiffs' "cross-appeal" is not proper - and this Court lacks jurisdiction over it -

because plaintiffs do not seek to alter the judgment of the District Court.

Indeed,

plaintiffs concede that they "accept the jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment on the
verdict." See Pis.' Br. at 3, 114. As this Court has emphasized, "[i]t is important to
remember that a cross-appeal is a separate appeal raising distinct issues for review" and
"a cross-appeal must be able to stand on its own." MacKay v. Hardy. 973 P.2d 941, 949
n.ll (Utah 1998). Here, plaintiffs' "cross-appeal" does not - and cannot - "stand on its
own" because under well-settled Utah law, a cross-appeal is proper only if a party is
seeking to "attack a judgment of a trial court for the purpose of enlarging their own rights
or lessening the rights of their opponent." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr.. 1999 UT 69,
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Tf 7, 983 P.2d 575, 578 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a party merely
desires affirmance of the lower court's judgment it must not, and should not, crossappeal. State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996).21
"Cross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a party has with the judgment as
it was entered -not grievances it might acquire depending on the outcome of the appeal."
Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In other words, a crossappeal is not a vehicle to seek advisory opinions from this Court in the event of a new
trial. Good reasons exist for this rule. '"Unnecessary cross-appeals . . . multiply the
number of briefs filed and lead to confusion of the issues presented." South. 924 P.2d at
356; see also Jordan v. Duff & Phelps. Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 439 (7th Cir. 1987) (crossappeals by parties receiving judgments in their favor unnecessarily "disrupt the briefing
schedule, increasing from three to four the number of briefs, and they make the case less
readily understandable to the judges").
In the present case, this Court's admonition in South is particularly relevant.
Plaintiffs apparently filed this improper cross-appeal so they could obtain the last word in
this appeal - an additional 25-page reply brief of issues that plaintiffs themselves concede

21

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' "cross-appeal" promptly after it was filed. See
Oct. 29, 1999 Motion to Dismiss. Because the Court deferred ruling on the Motion to
Dismiss, defendants now renew their Motion and incorporate in this brief the arguments
set forth in their Motion.
22

Although conditional cross-appeals are permitted by some courts, they are appropriate
only when a party is seeking to overturn or modify a judgment of a lower court and are
not proper vehicles to seek advisory opinions on rulings made during the trial. See
Defendants' Nov. 24, 1999 Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Cross-Appeal at 5-9
(citing cases).
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are only contingent.

Plaintiffs' novel approach to cross-appeals is contrary to the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure and undermines the orderly processing of appeals. This
Court should dismiss the cross-appeal.
II.

The District Court Did Not Err By Refusing To Rule As A Matter Of Law
That Richard Wiley Had An Attorney-Client Relationship With Plaintiffs.
Once again, plaintiffs argue a point defendants concede - all members of a law

firm owe duties of loyalty to the firm's clients. See Pis.' Br. at 115-116. However,
because plaintiffs sued Richard Wiley personally -separate and apart from his status as a
partner of Wiley Rein - they cannot recover against him based merely upon his
membership in the firm. To recover against Richard Wiley, plaintiffs had to present
evidence establishing the existence of a personal attorney-client relationship between
plaintiffs and Richard Wiley. Plaintiffs failed to do so below and do not now marshal
any evidence establishing that Richard Wiley had a personal attorney-client relationship
with any plaintiff. See Pis.' Br. at 114-116. The District Court was therefore correct to
reject plaintiffs' request to skip the threshold factual question and rule that, as a matter of
law, Richard Wiley 6Chad an attorney-client relationship with any plaintiff who is found to
be a client of [Wiley Rein]." kL at 116. See Sorenson, 585 P.2d at 460.
Plaintiffs cannot separately recover against Richard Wiley merely by resting on
the legal principle that each attorney of a firm owes a fiduciary duty to each client of the
firm. Pis.' Br. at 115. To allow plaintiffs to recover against Richard Wiley on this basis

Worse yet, plaintiffs may even have filed their "cross-appeal" with the intent to use
their cross-appeal reply as an impermissible sur-reply to the points raised in defendants'
reply to plaintiffs' opposition brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c).
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alone - without any showing that he had a personal attorney-client relationship with any
plaintiff and without any showing that he breached a personal duty owed to plaintiffs would permit plaintiffs an impermissible double recovery for the identical claims
asserted against Wiley Rein.
III.

The District Court Should Not Have Admitted The Indemnity Agreements
Between Allstate And Defendants To Prove Defendants9 Liability.
Plaintiffs' argument that the indemnity agreements between Allstate, Richard

Wiley and Wiley Rein should have been admitted as evidence of defendants' "liability,
intent and malice," Pis.' Br. at 122, is wrong for two reasons. First, if anything, the
indemnity agreements should not have been admitted for any purpose, as evidence of
these agreements was unfairly prejudicial and likely confused the jury. As a result, if this
Court deems it appropriate to give guidance to the District Court on this issue at all, it
should tell the court that the indemnity agreements should not be admitted into evidence
at any new trial. Second, at a minimum, the court correctly ruled that the indemnity
agreements could not be used to prove misconduct.
First, evidence of the indemnity agreements should have been excluded in their
entirety. Even if there was an evidentiary foundation for the admission of the indemnity
agreements for the purpose of showing bias, control or prejudice - the only uses
permitted by the District Court, see R.27119 (Nov. 18, 1998 Ruling at 20-21) - the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value of this evidence.
See Utah R. Evid. 403; see, e ^ , Braun v. Lorillard. No. 94-C796, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
205, at *4 (N.D. 111. Jan. 10, 1996) (excluding evidence of indemnity agreement offered
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to show bias where "existence of the indemnity agreement is likely to distract the jury
from essential issues which it is to resolve in a detached manner"), afPd, 84 F.3d 230
(7th Cir. 1996); Delicious Foods Co. v. Milliard Warehouse, 507 N.W.2d 631, 639-40
(Neb. 1993) (evidence that did not qualify for exclusion as "liability insurance" under
Rule 411 must still be excluded to establish liability because the probative value of the
evidence far outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice; if the jury learned that plaintiffs
loss was fully covered by another party, "the jury would decide the issue of [defendant's]
liability on the basis that [plaintiff] suffered no great damage").
In October 1989, ten months after Channel 13 was put up for sale, Allstate entered
into an indemnity agreement with Richard Wiley. R.29323-29328 (PX 255). At that
time Allstate (through its subsidiary Farragut Communications) owned Northstar, and
Northstar was the general partner of MWT Ltd. Id. Mr. Wiley was one of Northstar5 s
two directors. R.27112 at 125-126. Angered over Northstar's pending acceptance of the
Fox bid to purchase Channel 13, plaintiffs threatened to sue Northstar and its directors,
including Mr. Wiley, if they proceeded with the sale. In order to retain Mr. Wiley as
director of Northstar, Allstate promised to hold him harmless for any liability incurred as
a result of his remaining as a director - including any liability resulting from plaintiffs'
threatened lawsuit. R.29323-29328 (PX 255). After plaintiffs filed their suit against
defendants, Allstate amended the indemnity agreement to extend its protection to Wiley
Rein. R.29485-29488 (PX 279).
The indemnity agreements had no probative value, but they were highly
prejudicial.

They portrayed defendants as being covered by a "deep pocket" (i.e.,
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Allstate) and thereby facing no real liability. See, e.g.. Figueroa v. City of Chicago. No.
97-C8861, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5661, at *3 (N.D. 111. April 24, 2000) (evidence that
defendants would be indemnified by the City of Chicago's "deep pockets" excluded
under Rule 403 as such evidence was "unfairly prejudicial").

Knowledge of the

agreements also impermissibly permitted the jury to enter a multi-million dollar liability
verdict against defendants to punish Allstate and its subsidiary Northstar for what
plaintiffs strenuously contended throughout trial was wrongdoing by Allstate and
Northstar.24 Accordingly, the District Court should never have permitted plaintiffs to
admit the indemnity agreements at all. See DeMary v. Rieker. 695 A.2d 294, 303 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (error to admit indemnification agreement where agreement
"may have given the jury the impression that in returning a large verdict against
[defendant], it was also punishing [the indemnifying party]").
Second, plaintiffs' argument that the District Court erred in limiting the admission
of the indemnity agreements is founded on the false premise that the District Court held
the agreements were governed by Rule 411. Pis.' Br. at 45, 119. In fact, the District
Court ruling that plaintiffs challenge (but do not quote) shows clearly that the court
concluded that Rule 411 did not apply. Nevertheless, recognizing that admitting these
agreements in evidence to establish that defendants breached fiduciary duties was wholly
24

See* e ^ , R.24939 at 33 (Joseph Lee testifying that Northstar's failure to provide $2.6
million in financing for Channel 13 after Sidney Foulger defaulted on his loan
commitment "was the downfall of the whole thing"); R.21748 at 57-60 (due to the
inadequate financing by Allstate and Allstate's "decision to move forward with the sale
[of Channel 13]," plaintiffs' "valuable interest in Channel 13 was successively whittled
away to nothing").
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inappropriate and would be severely prejudicial, the District Court exercised its discretion
to limit the purpose for which the jury could use the indemnity agreements. See R.27119
(Nov. 18, 1998 Ruling at 20-24) ("I am persuaded that Rule 411 is not technically
applicable in this matter

However, the principals behind this [rule]... is similar

enough to Rule 411 to look at 411 for guidance into the prejudicial effect of admitting the
existence of this indemnity agreement."); see also R.20354 (Jury Inst. No. 14).
Though not expressly stated in its ruling, it is evident that the District Court
applied Rule 403 - that relevant evidence may be excluded if there is a "danger of unfair
prejudice." See Utah R. Evid. 403; see also Nay, 850 P.2d at 1262 ("Although the court
did not identify the rule of evidence on which it based its determination, [its]
language . . . indicates that the court found the evidence unfairly prejudicial under Utah
Rule of Evidence 403 . . . . We [therefore] review [the] trial court's determination... for
abuse of discretion . . . . " ) . The reason for plaintiffs' distortion of the court's ruling is
clear -plaintiffs want this Court to believe that the District Court made an "error of law,"
to obtain de novo review of this issue, rather than face the impossible task of
demonstrating that the court abused its discretion when it properly ruled that because
evidence related to the indemnity agreements would unfairly affect the jury's liability
determination, such evidence could not be used to establish wrongdoing. Pis.' Br. at 4.
As this Court has consistently held, rulings regarding admissibility of evidence
under Rule 403 are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be reversed only if the
ruling "is beyond the bounds of reasonability" and a party can show harm resulting from
the error. Nay, 850 P.2d at 1262. Plaintiffs never argue that the District Court's ruling

was "beyond the bounds of reasonability" or even state how they were harmed by the
court's ruling. These failures alone warrant rejection of plaintiffs' claim of error.
The District Court properly recognized that there was no connection between an
indemnity agreement aimed at keeping Richard Wiley as a director of Northstar and any
alleged breaches of his fiduciary duties as a lawyer before the date of the agreement. See
R.29323-29328 (PX 255). Further, it is not possible that the indemnity agreement
between Allstate and Wiley Rein - which was undisputedly entered into after this lawsuit
was filed and thus after the actions giving rise to the lawsuit had occurred - had any
relevance whatsoever to whether defendants did in fact breach any duties owed to
plaintiffs. See R.29485-29488 (PX 279).25
This Court should, therefore, direct the court overseeing any new trial to rule that
the indemnification agreements (and any evidence related to them) are inadmissible as
evidence of liability. Furthermore, these agreements should not even be admitted for the
limited purposes of showing control, bias or witness prejudice because their prejudice far
outweighs whatever probative value they may have.
IV.

The District Court Correctly Excluded The Appraisal And Testimony Of
Albin Seethaler.
The District Court properly excluded Albin Seethaler's appraisal, R.30378-30383

(PX 322), and his testimony because the court found that this evidence was not relevant

Plaintiffs provide no record support (because there is none) for their unfounded claim
that defendants must have "believed they may have breached their duties to plaintiffs"
because they received indemnification for "past actions." See Pis.' Br. at 121-22. It is
precisely this type of argument that shows why admitting the indemnity agreements was
so prejudicial to defendants.
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to any measure of damages related to plaintiffs' claims. Mr. Seethaler was offered by
plaintiffs to provide an opinion that the market value of a Fox-owned Channel 13 in 1998
was $149.5 million. Pis.' Br. at 122-123. Mr. Seethaler's appraisal and testimony were
inadmissible and utterly irrelevant to plaintiffs' damages in this case because: (1) the
1998 value of a Channel 13 owned by Fox bore no relevance to any damages resulting
from alleged '"breaches of fiduciary duties in the 1990 time frame," Pis.' Br. at 123; and
(2) Mr. Seethaler's appraisal was speculative and based on the hypothesized revenues of
a Fox-owned Channel 13. The District Court therefore correctly excluded this proffered
evidence.

Furthermore, because plaintiffs fail to challenge the District Court's

determination that Mr. Seethaler's appraisal and testimony should also be excluded
because it was prejudicial and would confuse the jury, the District Court's ruling should
not be disturbed.
First, the 1998 market value of a Channel 13 run by a national media giant has no
conceivable bearing on damages plaintiffs suffered between 1987 and, at the latest, 1990,
when that station was sold to Fox. As the District Court noted, "if the plaintiffs sold the
station in April of 1990, how can the position then be [that] they're then entitled to the
appreciated value from 1990 to 1998?" R.27127 (Oct. 27 1998 Ruling at 74-75). In
other words, the Court recognized that eight years of ownership and management by a
successful broadcast network necessarily affected the value of the station and thus
stripped the evidence of any conceivable relevance to the claims in this lawsuit.
Accordingly, the court properly excluded Mr. Seethaler's appraisal "for the purpose of
establishing the present value of a lost business opportunity
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" IdL at 76. See State v.

Kohl. 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7, 12-13 (court has "broad discretion to determine
whether proffered evidence is relevant," and error is found "only if the trial court has
abused its discretion") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Slisze v. StanleyBostitoh, 1999 UT 20,117, 979 P.2d 317, 321.
Second, Mr. Seethaler's figures were completely speculative and thus legally
insufficient to form a proper basis for awarding damages. See, e.g.. Canyon Country. 781
P.2d at 414. Admittedly, however, Mr. Seethaler's own testimony does not bear out the
District Court's finding. Mr. Seethaler admitted that he did not use any actual historical
numbers or information in arriving at his 1998 appraised value of the Fox-owned
Channel 13, even though the station had been owned and operated by Fox for eight years
at the time of Mr. Seethaler's appraisal, and historical operating information existed.
R.27127 at 29, 34-37. The failure to use actual historical numbers in his appraisal is all
the more strildng because plaintiffs never made any attempts to obtain the information
from Fox, by subpoena or otherwise. Id at 33-34. Damage evidence (such as an
appraisal) based on estimates and guesses rather than on available historic data is
speculative. See, e ^ , Brown v. McIBS. Inc.. 722 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Mo. App. 1986) (to
prove lost profits for an existing business "[i]t is indispensable that this proof include the
income and expenses of the business for a reasonable anterior period"). Mr. Seethaler's
appraisal and testimony should therefore also be excluded on this alternative basis.
Finally, plaintiffs' challenge to the District Court's ruling is fatally flawed because
plaintiffs focus on only one part of the court's ruling -that the proffered appraisal was
irrelevant - b u t fail to challenge (or even address) the District Court's alternative reasons
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for excluding Mr. Seethaler's appraisal and testimony. These additional reasons were as
follows:

(1) Mr. Seethaler's appraisal "would be more prejudicial than probative"

because it was offered to value an opportunity lost by plaintiffs' in 1990 but did not
account for the fact that by 1998, Channel 13 had been in the hands of the extremely
successful Fox network for eight years; and (2) Mr. Seethaler's testimony would not aid
the jury because it was based on "a horrendously confusing set of facts and numbers and
theories and assumptions."

See R.27127 (Oct. 22, 1998 Ruling at 76-78).

Since

plaintiffs never challenged these portions of the District Court's ruling, this Court should
affirm the court's decision to bar admission of Mr. Seethaler's appraisal and testimony.
See, e.g.. American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech.. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5
(Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned.").
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in defendants' opening brief, the verdict and
judgment against Wiley Rein should be reversed and judgment should enter in its favor
that: (1) Wiley Rein did not have an attorney-client relationship with any plaintiff after
May 1988, (2) Wiley Rein did not breach its duty of confidentiality to any plaintiff,
(3) plaintiffs are not entitled to lost ownership damages, (4) plaintiffs are not entitled to
cash distribution damages, and (5) plaintiffs are not entitled to cash call damages; any
issues remaining thereafter should be remanded to the District Court for a new trial on
both liability and damages. The verdict and judgment against Richard Wiley should also
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be entirely vacated and judgment should enter in his favor on all claims.

In the

alternative, the Court should vacate the judgment against each defendant and grant each
defendant a new trial on both liability and damages.
In addition, for the reasons set forth above and in defendants' previously filed
Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs'

purported

"cross-appeal" should be

dismissed.

Alternatively, the Court should affirm the District Court's rulings challenged by plaintiffs
and direct the court overseeing any new trial that: (1) Richard Wiley does not have an
attorney-client relationship with any plaintiff, (2) evidence regarding the indemnification
agreements between Allstate, Wiley Rein and Richard Wiley is inadmissible for any
purpose, and (3) the appraisal and testimony of Albin Seethaler is inadmissible.
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Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of November, 2000.
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